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INTRODUCTION
The entire Critical philosophy is an attempt to understand the
principles of thought in their relation to man’s experience of knowing,
acting and judging. And as Kant declares in the Preface to the Critique
of. Practical Reason
,
the concept of freedom "is the keystone of the
whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative
reason. " Therefore the relation between reason and freedom must be
seen as one of the chief concerns of the Kantian program. In fact,
rather than finding freedom in opposition to the necessary laws of rea-
son, Kant maintains that it is the necessary presupposition as well as
the essential product of such laws. This, I shall argue, is the real
Copernican Revolution of the Critical philosophy, one that points to an
interpretation and focus that I have found to be underdeveloped and
unappreciated in Kantian scholarship.
Kant s treatment of the concept of freedom is not unproblematic
however. Kant goes on to say in the Preface to the second Critique that
the concept of freedom is such a keystone only "in so far as its reality
is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, that is, that the
concept of freedom really applies to something. But many of Kant's
critics feel that this creates a disparity between the first and second
Critiques
. Is not the negative conclusion of the first Critique
2concerning the limitation of the categories to appearances, nullified in
the second Critique when Kant begins to speak positively of the cate-
gories relation to noumenal being in his attempt to show the reality of
freedom ?
Kant himself recognizes this to be the riddle of his program.
Now is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, whichles in the fact that we must renounce the objective reality ofthe supersensible use of the categories in speculation and yetcan attribute this reality to them in respect to the objects ofpure practical reason.'^
The solution to this riddle, which goes to the very heart of the relation
between reason and freedom, is offered by Kant in the same paragraph:
The inconsistency vanishes because the use which is now made of these
concepts is different from that required by speculative reason. To
understand this answer, which is an essential part of the program of this
dissertation, is to understand the unity of the three Critiques as they
provide different principles necessary for the theoretical, moral and
teleological aspects of our experience. To put it differently, it is to
understand the unity of reason itself as it seeks to satisfy ail of its pur-
poses--a unity which would be impossible independent of its reciprosity
with freedom
.
Intimately bound up with this solution is the seemingly paradoxi-
cal explanation of the compatibility of freedom and determinism presented
Critique of Pure Reason
. How is it possible to regard one and the
same event as being in one aspect a determined effect of nature and in
3another aspect an effect due to freedom? Or, if we make the
point with relation to man himself, how
same
can one regard one's self as
noumenally free and yet from the point of view of
enally determined? To my mind, Kant'
nature, as phenom-
s answer to this question has not
been fully understood. Furthermore, if his attempt to show the compati-
bility of freedom and determinism i s not sound, then, as he himself
realizes, his entire efforts in the second Critique to prove the reality
of freedom must be seen as in vain. Therefore, a critical examination
and vindication of his solution to the Third Antinomy constitutes another
essential part of my dissertation.
The legitimacy of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy depends
upon Kant's theory of transcendental idealism, which provides a frame-
work within which the correct limitation and employment of the funda-
mental categories of mind can be described. The practical concept of
causality through freedom is only applicable within the realm of noumena
making morality possible, while the theoretical concept of natural
causality is only applicable within the realm of phenomena, making
science possible.
In his reflections on metaphysics Kant reaffirms the importance of
freedom as well as his transcendental idealism: "There are two cardinal
principles of all metaphysics; the ideality of space and time and the
reality of the concept of freedom. But it is exactly in joining these
two cardinal principles that the above mentioned riddle appears. Given
4the first cardinal principle and what Kant says about the categories of
mind in the first Critique, namely that their objective reality is justi-
fied only with the ideality of space and time, how can he account for
the second cardinal principle?
Ironic as it may seem, however, it is Kant's transcendental
Idealism that allows him to solve this riddle as well as the antinomy of
freedom and natural necessity. To understand Kant's transcendental
Idealism as a mere limitation of reason is to miss the power and free-
dom that it gives to reason in its efforts toward a proper metaphysics.
It provides a theory of meaning and a framework for setting up different
models of interpretation and justification. This is central to under-
standing what Kant means by referring to one and the same event from
different standpoints, by speaking of an extension of the category of
causality into the practical sphere® and, in the Critique of Tudgment
. by
extending the use of this same category even further to cover teleologi-
cal causality, another important aspect of our experience which demands
interpretation and justification.
There is no way to understand this Critical program independently
of how Kant unfolds his transcendental idea of freedom. In reconciling
its problems and in substantiating its reality Kant is at the same time
unpacking the freedom or spontaneity of reason itself. The critique of
pure reason is essentially the revelation of reason's proper freedom and
powers. Rather than cutting off the serpent's head of metaphysics,
5Kant gives it its proper freedom-a freedom I shall attempt to come to
terms with in this dissertation by dealing with Kanfs answer to the
problem of freedom and determinism in the first Critique and his search
for the objective reality of freedom in the second Critique and else-
where which places us face to face with Kanfs self-admitted riddle.
In tackling the problem of freedom and determinism in Part I of
this dissertation, I cannot overlook the recent objections that Kanfs
solution has been made obsolete due to Heisenberg and quantum physics.
This dissertation must answer the quite serious charge that modern phys-
ics has eliminated the whole problem of freedom and determinism sinoe
the problem stems out of a now outdated Newtonianism, and further-
more, that even if there were still a problem, Kanfs solution is no
longer interesting since it is wedded to this Newtonianism.
To answer such a charge I must first try to understand what Heisen-
berg's uncertainty principle means and what its implications for the
problem are as well as what Kanfs determinism among phenomena means
and then to try and see if the two are in any way incompatible. Such
attempts quite naturally demand that I deal with Kanfs Second Analogy
of Experience out of which his claim about the natural necessity among
events springs. One can understand neither Kant's solution to the Third
Antinomy nor whether it has been made obsolete by Heisenberg's causal
indeterminancy principle unless what he means by the category of
causality is properly understood.
6I Shall argue that when Kanfs determinism is understood properly,
in its critical or transcendental sense, Heisenberg's principle, under
both the interpretations that I have been able to uncover, does not
invalidate the problem of freedom and determinism that Kant struggles
With in the Critique of Pure Reason
But to show the present relevance of the problem is not to provide
its solution, which Kant attempts to do by resolving the Third Antinomy.
Some Kantian scholars have argued that Kant misunderstood the AnUnoray
and therefore did not solve it within the Critical spirit. Part of my pro-
gram is to free Kant from such criticism by properly understanding the
Antinomy which demands that I make clear the importance and function
of reason's regulative nature.
Once this groundwork has been laid, I hope to be in a position to
explicate Kant’s explanation of the compatibility between transcendental
freedom and natural necessity—a problem which turns around the ques-
tion mentioned earlier, namely, how one and the same event can be seen
as both empirically determined and yet as the free effect of an intelligi-
ble cause. Furthermore, I think it will be clear in this explication why
this question could not be answered without laying such a groundwork.
The key to Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy, which I shall
try to develop and make intelligible, concerns what it means for reason
to bo transferred into or to carve out for itself different explanatory
frameworks or models according to different purposes. And to understand
7this again demands that we recognize the regulative employment of rea-
son as It seeks to unify its own operations. Furthermore, 1 am con-
vinced that when one understands this not only is real light shed upon
the seemingly arbitrary and paradoxical solution to the freedom-
determinism problem but also what Kant was doing in the third Critique
With teleological principles becomes excitingly consistent with the
determinism of the first Critique
.
However, to show the logical possibility of freedom, which Kant
claims to have done by solving the Third Antinomy, is not to show its
real possibility. The reality of freedom according to Kant can only be
demonstrated through its relation to action and moral responsibility,
that IS, within the domain of practical reason, whose principles Kant
attempts to uncover in his second Critique
. But it is this very purpose
that leads to the riddle of the Critical philosophy because it extends the
use of the category of causality, for example, into the noumenal realm,
namely, causality through freedom, and proceeds to deduce its objec-
tive reality. Part II of this dissertation is an explication of Kant's
demonstration of the objective reality cf freedom which will not only
elucidate his theory of freedom and his rationality of action but will also
open the door to his answer to the riddle—an answer which is the practi-
cal complement to his solution to the Third Antinomy.
In order to accomplish this purpose I shall outline the Kantian
machinery essential for the rationality of action, for it is here that
8freedom shows its actuelity. This is to give the metaphysical deduction
of pure practical principles, a deduction which has its theoretical
counterpart in the first Critiaue. By following the demands of pure
practical reason, which requires the elimination of all empirical condi-
tions from its principles, 7 Kant leads us to the principle of autonomy
pointing to a purely formal and normative dimension of thought. Such
a deduction must, therefore, not only distinguish empirical from pure
practical principles but also provide an analysis of imperatives which
will distinguish hypothetical from categorical practical principles.
In order, however, to establish the possibility of categorical
imperatives, which are the laws of freedom, Kant must establish a theory
of rational desire whose objects are a priori determinable such that the
will is determined by purely formal principles of thought. In developing
this higher faculty of desire, one at the same time focuses upon a nature
of thought which Is self-legislating and which grounds the categorical
validity of intentions. The rationality of action presupposes this rational
theory of desire which is really the normative-prescriptive function of
thought itself.
This determination of the content of a maxim of action by its form,
that is, by the form of the categorical law of reason, is the exact
point at which the critics of Kant's formalism attack. Therefore, I must
defend Kant from such attacks if I am to make any sense of his theory
of freedom and action. If the categorical imperative is misconceived by
9Kant, then so too is his theory of freedom since the former Is the law of
freedom
.
To lay the complete groundwork for the reality of freedom I must
deal with more than the logic of practical reasoning. To show how pure
reason can be practical I must also deal with the metaphvslc of practi-
cal reasoning which goes beyond the categorical validity of practical
laws by exploring their causal efficacy within the concrete world of
events and actions. This demands a study of Kant's theory of will,
including both its determinations and its freedom.
To understand Kant's full-blown theory of will I shall have to un-
ravel one of the darkest areas of Kantian scholarship, namely, the dis-
tinction and interrelation between Wille and Willkur as well as the
concept of ^sinnung which serves to unify the will and establish a mo-
ral personality and identity. Necessary to the understanding of Wille
and Wnikiir as two abstracted functions of a unitary theory of will is the
unique spontaneity which must be predicated of each; without the former
there would be no freedom of legislation, without the latter no freedom of
choosing. To put this differently, I sliall try to show that whereas
Willkur without Wille is rationally blind and, therefore, empirically
bound, Wille without W illkiir is causally impotent to have any of its com-
mands actualized. The freedom of Wi lle identifies man as a part of
humanity with all of the moral responsibilities and dignity that accom-
pany that predication. The freedom of Willkur has the potentiality of
10
rejecting the anove freedom, lowering man to a position where he acts
as if he were not free, as well as the potentiality to actualize this most
basic freedom of rationality, a freedom which in the final analysis he
can no more escape than he can his own self. These two different senses
of freedom as applied to WlMr must be made clear if Kanfs theory of
will is to be understood.
However, this very important groundwork does not in and of itseJf
prove the objective reality of freedom. For this, Kant sees the neces-
sity of a transcendental deduction which critics have accused of being
viciously circular. I shall argue that such accusations are based upon
a misunderstanding of the deduction, a misunderstanding which can be
traced to a failure to realize what Kant has already established about
transcendental freedom in the first Critique
. Unless one understands
the essential unity of the two Critiques
, one will never grasp the key to
Kant s deduction of the moral law and hence of freedom; and conversely,
unless one grasps the heart of the deduction, the unity of the whole
Kantian program will be overlooked. Little wonder that Kant speaks of
freedom as the keystone to his entire Critical system.
In this transcendental deduction of the moral law the reciprocity
between freedom and reason reaches a climax, enabling the apparent
opacity of the riddle of the Critical philosophy to become transparent.
What was thought to be an enigma turns out to be a failure to understand
reason's proper functions as it seeks to unify its various purposes. It
11
is the same understanding of reason that is at work in solving the Third
Antinomy, m fact, rather than the deduction of the reality of freedom
being recalcitrant to the CntiaueoLPure^^
,he two Critiques
dovetail together in mutual support. What I shall attempt to show
through this dissertation is that the concept of freedom in both its theo-
retical and practical contexts is central to understanding the real unity
Of the Kantian program which revolves around the necessary and inter-
related uses of man's rationality as it freely works order and intelligl.
bility into the different dimensions of our humanity.
PART I
FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM
Introduction
In the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique Kant sets forth
the ancient problem of freedom and determinism by way of the Third
Antinomy. As I see it, in dealing with this problem and Kant's attempted
solution, one is in a position to feel the very heartbeat of the Critical
philosophy as it works life into the realms of nature and morality.
The problem arises out of a conflict of reason with itself as it
seeks an unconditioned ground which will provide a unity for all condi-
tions
. That reason must be understood as searching for an uncondi-
tioned ground is a presupposition Kant makes throughout his Critical
writings. In fact, the entire Critical program might be seen as an attempt
to transcendentally justify this presupposition. Kant is attempting to
understand the activities of reason which, he believes, remain unintel-
ligible unless one sees reason as essentially incomplete and as search-
ing for completion in an unconditioned ground. It is my hope that this
dissertation will shed some light on this theory of reason.
In the thesis of the Third Antinomy reason sees the necessity of
postulating a free causality "without which, even in the ^ordinaryj^
13
course of nature, the series of appearances on the side of the causes
can never be complete. '! On the other hand, in the antithesis, there
is a denial of such transcendental freedom on the ground that it would
undercut the unity of the work of the understanding so that “the appear-
ances which in their natural course are regular and uniform would be
rGduc6d to disordGr and incohGFGncG
,
Kant, howGVGr, attGmpts to tgsoIvg this conflict by showing the
compatibility botwGGn the thesis and the antithesis, and I shall attempt
to understand this solution in Chapter II. This solution is important not
only because it shows the logical possibility of freedom, if it is success
ful, but also because it allows us to see Kant’s theory of being in its
relation to the spontaneity of mind.
Many contemporary critics of Kant feel, however, that quantum
physics has dissolved the problem of freedom and determinism. Henry
Margenau, for example, says:
Modern physics, through Heisenberg's principle of inde-
terminacy, has loosened Laplacian determinism sufficiently
to allow uncaused atomic events, permitting in certain
specifiable situations the incidence of genuine chance.^
Kant therefore saw a problem, Margenau argues, only because he saw no
reason to doubt classical physics, which implies a mechanistic neces-
sity among natural events. In Chapter I I shall argue against this
interpretation of Kant.
CHAPTER I
KANT'S THEORY OF CAUSAL DETERMINISM AND
THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN PHYSICS
(1) A Sketch of Modern Physics and Its Debate
Before I begin this sketch of the debate within modern physics, I
want to emphasize the modesty of my aims in offering such a sketch.
The technicalities of relativity physics and of the principle of indeter-
minacy are beyond the scope of the purposes of this dissertation. I am
only interested in the philosophical implications of modern physics and,
then, only as they relate to Kant's theory of causal determinism. I
shall make use of this sketch in attempting to indicate such relation-
ships in sections (3) and (4).
According to classical mechanics, within a specified closed
physical system in which there is knowledge of an event E^^ and of an
appropriate law L, it should be possible to predict and calculate the
occurence of an event E
2
with exact certainty. Upon this view Margenau
states that
The course of events in the universe is a single flow; there
is no ambiguity about the happenings at any given time, aside
from our knowledge of them, and if a superhuman intellect
knew everything that happened up to a certain time T, he would
15
bura®riai'ri‘"f‘n°H“®
<=lear determinism,t a rigid, filled space-time structure of events.
What quantum physics has done to this rather frozen picture Is to can-
cel the inferential symmetry along the time axis and introduce an asym-
metry into events with respect to their temporality. The past is certain
but the future is not. When dealing with subatomic events, the law
relating and may be only probabilistic so that Ej and law L are not
sufficient conditions for predicting
Although the inadequacies of Newtonian physics have been dis-
cussed since 1885 with the Michelson-Morley experiment, the nature of
the probabilistic laws which characterize contemporary physics is still
subject to debate. As I understand it, such debate marks the difference
between Einstein's mechanics and quantum mechanics.^ What Heisen-
berg discovered in 1927 is that we can never know whether a given initial
state determines a subsequent state since we can never know simulta-
neously the position and velocity of the initial state which go together
to define the state of a particle. This is so because our measuring pro-
cess unavoidably interferes with the object measured. Karl Popper
characterizes Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in the following way:
A ray of light, for example, might be directed upon the object,
and part of the dispersed light reflected by the object might
be absorbed by the measuring apparatus. Any such exchange
of energy will alter the state of the object which, after being
measured, will be in a state different from before. Thus the
measurement yields, as it were, knowledge of a state which
has just been destroyed by the measuring process itself.^
16
Einstein interprets Heisenberg's principle as essentially an epistemolo-
gical principle which leaves classical determinism unthreatened.
Indefiniteness lies not in the nature of things but in the observer whose
acts of observation are unavoidably acts of participation which disturb
the reality being observed. As the French philosopher Leon Brunschwicg
puts it:
It remains to understand that this ^Heisenberg's principle 7 bv
thare^ th
breakup of determinism; it merely meansat at e present stage of our experimental technique we
cannot be satisfied any longer with a simple-minded and dog-
atic form of determinism which is interested in reality withoutbeing interested in knowledge.^
Such an interpretaUon allows Einstein to maintain his belief that we must
not "accept the view that events in nature are analogous to a game of
chance, and Max Planck to state:
I must definitely declare my own belief that the assumption
of a strict dynamic causality is to be preferred simply because
the idea of a dynamically law-governed universe is of wider
and deeper application than the merely statistical idea.
.
.
On the other hand, Heisenberg argues that the probability of
physical laws cannot simply be explained because of the inabilities of
the observer but rather reference must be made to the contingent random-
ness of the elementary particles that constitute physical reality itself,
thereby rejecting the hidden determinism of Einstein and Planck. The
concept of probability is introduced into the theoretical definition of the
ontological states of quantum mechanics. I must admit that the grounds
for Heisenberg's position are not completely clear to me. However, I
think Heisenberg is saying at least in part that the philosophical impli-
cations of quantum mechanics demand that we no longer separate
observed objective reality from the acts of the observer and to do so
is to refer back to the old materialistic ontology. As Heisenberg
says in The Ph^i c.al Principles of the Quantum Theory "an 'objec-
tive' physics in this sense, i.e. a sharp division of the world into
object and subject has indeed ceased to be possible. Consistent
v^ith this is the following analogy by Max Born that man is no longer
to be seen as an isolated spectator of the flow of events:
We may compare the observer of a physical phenomenon not
with the audience of a theatrical performance, but with that
of a football game where the act of watching, accompanied
by applauding or hissing, has a marked influence on the
speed and concentration of the players, and thus on what is
watched
.
^ ^
This means that the focus of scientific explanation has shifted from
nature as an independent reality to man's observation of nature and with
this shift goes a whole new ontology.
(2) An Interpretation of Kant's Second Analogy
With this very brief sketch of contemporary physics I now want to
ask if it is incompatible with what Kant says about natural causality in
the first Critique
. In other words can we free what Kant is saying about
causal necessity among phenomena from the outdated Newtonianism
,
which admittedly he believed to be true and adequate? In order to
18
answer this question I must first understand what Kant is doing in the
Second Analogy of Experience, that a priori synthetic principle which
states that 'all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the
connection of cause and effect.
Most Kant scholars agree as to the importance of the Second
Analogy and would affirm along with H. Paton that "for Kant the real
crux of his doctrine is to be found there, Even such an avid critic
as Jonathan Bennett writes that the Second Analogy is "one of the great
passages in modern philosophy. At the same time, however, it is
one of the most unclear parts of the first Critique and, therefore, one
of the most misunderstood.
I take the central argument of the Second Analogy to be an attempt
to uncover what must be the case if we are to know, from among our
representations, of the occurence of an event, assuming, as Kant does,
that all events are represented to us successively. In fact, for Kant,
all our representations are successive even when they are of permanent
states of affairs such as a house. For example, in observing the house
beginning from the top, we see the basement after we see the roof.
On the other hand, we would have seen the basement before the roof if
we had observed the house in the reverse order. Unlike this example,
however, the successiveness of some of our representations
,
namely
those of events, is irreversible, as in the watching of a ship move
downstream. As Kant puts it:
19
cemna'statTnTth
" happening (the pre-
ceeZa hf R ^ k entitle A, and the suc-
^ apprehended only as following upon A‘the perception A cannot follow upon B but only preceL it
order in which the perceptions suceed one another inpprehension is in this instance gamely the ship example 7determined, and to this order apprehension is bound down
. . . . in the perception of an event there is always a rulethat makes the order in which the perceptions (in the appre-hension of this appearance) follow upon one another anecessary order .
®
Kant IS seeking an explanation as to why I cannot arrange the succes-
sion of my representations in any other order. Why, in cases like the
above, is the order of my representations determined (bestimmt ) ? His
answer is that "we must derive the subjective succession of appre-
hension from the objective succession of appearances
. Otherwise the
order of apprehension is entirely undetermined, and does not distin-
guish one appearance from another. "1 ^
-phe irreversibility of my
representation being succeeded by R
2
must be explained in terms
of the successiveness of and
,
the events represented. Further-
more, the subjective succession of R^ and R
2
is not a sufficient condi-
tion for establishing the objective succession of E^ and "since the
subjective succession by itself is altogether arbitrary
.
^ Therefore,
the necessity of this objective succession of events will consist in
the conformity to a rule, namely, that of causality.
In order that this relation be known as determined, the rela-
tion between the two states must be so thought that it is
thereby determined as necessary which of them must be
placed before, and which of them after, and that they can-
not be placed in the reverse relation. But the concept
20
which carries with it a necessity of synthetic unity can onlybe a pure concept of the relation of cause ^
Kant is saying that our knowledge of the occurence of an event
is essentially bound up with our consciousness of the Irreversibility
of the order in which we apprehend the event. In fact, Kant says that
this is the "sole empirical criterion of an effect in its relation to the
causality of the cause which precedes it. "20 j however, with
N. K. Smith that "Kant in this second Analogy does not argue that
irreversibility Is by itself proof of causal relation, but only that con-
sciousness of such irreversibility demands the employment of the
conception of causality. "21 The Humean dilemma resulted from try-
ing to discover a proof of causality based upon empirical criteria
alone. Kant's problem is to find out how to render this subjective syn-
thesis of apprehension objectively valid, 22 and ^,43 answer is that we
must employ the thought of causality such that our knowledge of the
occurence of an event necessarily presupposes that there Is some
other event which is causally related to it thereby determining the order
of our observations. This is a presupposition without which the very
experience of an event would be impossible, 22 since "in the synthesis
of appearances the manifold of representations is always successive"
and I perceive or assume that in this succession there is a relation
to the preceding state, from which the representation follows in
21
conformity with a rule. "24 saying that when we experience
something that happens, we cannot reverse our observations, because
to recognize something as an event is to already place it within a
fr0iTiGwork of c3usg 3nd GffGct.
Kant's answGr to Humo, thoroforG, is thG following; If all suc-
CGSsion of pGrcGptions worG mGrGly subjGctivG, thGn GxpGriGncG would
be "a play of roprosontations
,
rolating to no objGct; that is to say, it
would not bG possiblG through our pGrcGption to distinguish ono
appoarancG from anothor as rGgards rolations of timG. Humo admits
that WG arG conscious of a succession of events from which the con-
cept of cause is abstracted. According to Kant, however, such an
argument is totally misconceived because, as L. W. Beck puts it:
The distinction between event-sequences and mere sequences
of representations (which is all Hume has a right to claim to
know) itself requires the principle that the object of one repre-
sentation must precede the object of the other. But this prin-
ciple is equivalent to the causal principle itself. Hence in
supposing that we observe sequences of events and then
come to know by generalization that the earlier event is the
cause of the later, Hume put the cart before the horse. We
do not know that we are cognizing events except when we
know that events are causally related in a way in which
simultaneous states of affairs /^.g. the roof and basement
of a houseJ7 are not causally related.
Against Hume, the Kantian position is that concepts such as causality
can be found in experience "only because we have put them into
experience, and because experience is thus itself brought about only
by their means
.
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The proof of the second Analogy is an exemplification of Kant's
transcendental deductive method which follows this schema: Any
formal element without which experience would be impossible is neces-
sary. In the experience of an event the order of our apprehension is
determined such that one cannot know of the occurrence of an event
without regarding the order of his apprehension as irreversible. If
this were not true, the observation of events could not be distinguished
from the observation of permanent states. The consciousness of such
irreversibility would be impossible without the employment of the con-
cept of causality which states that every event follows some other
event according to a rule. The employment of the category of causality,
therefore, is necessary.
This proof of the necessity of the category of causality in no way
says that the verification of specific events is a priori, nor does it
say that, given any specific event, there must be necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for its occurring. Kant is arguing that the form of
the causal law is necessary and universal. We are not able to know of
the occurrence of an event unless we employ the thought of causality.
Otherwise there would be no way to account for the irreversibility of
the order of our apprehension of events.
Kant is not saying that if it would be impossible to observe two
successive events, and
,
without observing E2 after E^
,
that it
would be impossible for E^^ to exist without E2 existing after it.
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Rather Kent Is arguing that, by actually observing two such events, we
are not thereby enabled to know that an event Is occurring unless
we employ the thought that some event such as caused E2
.
There are, of course, instances (for example thunder and lighten-
ing) where E^ causes E2
, and yet we observe E2 before E^
. This might
seem to cast Kanfs irreversibility thesis into doubt. But Kant himself
notes that many causes are simultaneous with their effects, for exam-
ple, a stove heating and the room warming or a ball laying on a cushion
and a hollow in the cushion occurring. Kant is not saying or trying
to explain h^ a person, who knows of two events, knows which takes
place first. He is arguing that if we are to know of an event's occur-
ring, then we must employ the thought of causality in order to assign
a temporal order to the event by reference to some prior event which
serves as its cause. Kant asks us not to "fail to note that it is the
or^ of time, not the lapse of time, with which we have to reckon.
And an event "can acquire this determinate position in this relation of
time only in so far as something is presupposed in the preceding state
upon which it follows invariably, that is, in accordance with a rule.
This applies in the case where the cause is simultaneous with the
effect just as it does when cause and effect are in serial succession.
"I cannot reverse the series, placing that which happens prior to that
upon which it follows. I could not know, according to Kant, of the
occurrence of an event, such as the warming of the room, if there were
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no way of temporally determining it with relation to some other event,
such as the heating of the stove, so that it would be impossible for
the former event to precede the latter.
It is probably worth noting at this point a possible confusion in
Kant's development of the Second Analogy. The language of the argu-
ment lends itself to a realistic interpretation in that it refers to a
subjective succession of representations and an objective succession
of events to which our representations correspond. We must, however,
constantly keep in mind Kant's transcendental idealism: "How things
may be in themselves, apart from the representations through which
they may affect us, is entirely outside our sphere of knowledge
.
Events for Kant are appearances, and the point of Kant's argument is to
distinguish the different relations these appearances have to each
other. It, therefore, would probably be less confusing, although much
more awkward, to refer to a "successive-state-perception-series
,
rather than to talk in terms of perceptions that correspond to events.
It must be remembered that Kant is seeking to establish the source of
the objectivity of experience which cannot be established through mere
observation alone.
A Kantian scholar who criticizes the argument of the Second Anal-
ogy by falling into the above confusion is P. I'. Strawson. He argues
that Kant eguivocates on the notion of necessity by shifting from the
necessity of the order of our perceptions, which is a conceptual
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necessity
..given that which is observed is in fact a change from A to
A and B themselves. Straw-
B, to a causal necessity existing between
inues by saying It is a very curious contortion indeed where-
by a conceptual necessity based on the fact of a change is equated
with the causal necessity of that very change.
But as 1 have tried to point out, Kant's argument cannot be inter-
preted in this manner. What Strawson is assuming is that it is analytic
that our perceptions are irreversible in this case, because we are
observing an event, when this is actually begging Kant's question.
Kant is saying that we cannot know that what we are observing is in
fact a change from A to B unless the category of causality is already at
work. Kant is not shifting from a conceptual necessity among our
appearances to a causal necessity among objects, but rather trying to
explain the objectivity which exists among the appearances which make
up our experience. He is trying to discover what will make our "sub-
jective synthesis of apprehension objective
. Strawson's main mis-
take, I think, IS to fall into the trap of interpreting Kant's language
along lines of realism which is evidenced by what he calls Kant's
thesis of objectivity: "that experience must include awareness of ob-
jects which are distinguishable from experiences of them. Such a
confusion unfortunately colors the rest of Strawson's interpretations of
Kant, including his reading of the causal proof.
Another interesting criticism has been recently given by J. Bennett
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who argues that Just as my observations of the house could have been
otherwise arranged. If i had acted differently, so too my observations
of the ship could have occurred In a different order. If, for example,
"the coxswain of the boat was under orders from me, I couW ha™
secured for myself the spectacle of the boat being back-paddled, storn
foremost Into the harbor. ''37 But the obvious mistake Bennett makes
is that, in his example, he Is no longer referring to the same event.
Given a ^fferenl event, our perceptions of It, of course, will be In
a different order. Furthermore, as W. A. Suchtlng correctly points
out,
to the
the difference between my bringing this about by orders
coxswain and my bringing about a different order of percep-tions of the parts of houseJ7 is that in the former case Ican bring about a different order of perceptions only by
causally influencing the state of affairs itself, whilst in the
case of the /^houseJ7 i can bring about the difference by
causally influencing myself alone. ^
(3) Relations between the Second Analogy and the
Principle of Indeterminacy
Going back now to our original question, we may ask how does
contemporary physics, especially the indeterminacy principle, relate
to what Kant says about causality in the Second Analogy? First, I
should like to affirm my agreement with L. W. Beck,^^ that rather than
making Kant's views on causality indefensible, the indeterminacy prin-
ciple, on the contrary, seems to require the Second Analogy for its own
arguments
.
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Although Hunne and Kant disagree as to the origin of the ooncopt
of causality, nevertheless they both agree that event-series must be
seen as causally related. However, if the modern physicist is saying
that there are non-causally related (i.e.
, statistically related) event-
series (i.e., sub-atomic event-series) which can be recognized as
event-series independently of any causal laws,« then a disagreement
of a different kind arises, since Kant maintains that we recognize
events only by using the concept of cause. As Beck correctly sees,
Kant would ask the following question: "How does the physicist know
that E2 temporally follows Ej ? More fundamentally, how does he know
that his representations and are representations of events, if the
events in question are not causally related
To obtain evidence that there is a subatomic event which is a
member of an event-series following subatomic event and which is
not governed by any causal law (that is, given E^ and some law it is
not the case that we can necessarily predict E^), the physicist must
somehow conrelate these subatomic events with empirically observable
phenomena, such as flashes of light and clock readings. Borrowing
Beck's own example, let us say that the flashes of light and are
evidence from the unobserved subatomic events and that we set our
clock at Cj marking time when we see Fj
,
and we discover that in
a percentage of cases (perhaps even 99% of the time) F^ occurs when
the clock is at at time T^. The point is this: In order for the
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Physicist to know that and are events not causally related to each
other, there had to be a “Hlor dec^ that the states of affairs we call
events in the clock-series are causally related and hence Invariably
associated with each other in a fixed orHord i a ae
,
and upon empirical fact
that the F-series is not invariably correlated with the C-series.
That is
,
the only way we can say E^ and are events is by
realizing the temporal successivene^ of the flashes of light which are
like Kant's representations of an event series. And the only way we
can realize this successiveness of the F-series is by means of its cor-
relation with the C-series whose temporal determinations we know
because of its causal relatedness. Without such correlation we could
not know that could not appear before F^
, and that if that could
occur, then that which the F-series represents would not be events at
all but rather simultaneous states of affairs (as in Kant's house example).
I agree, therefore, with Beck that
there are good epistemological grounds for regarding our know-
ledge of indeterminacy as parasitic upon our knowledge of
causal determinacy. Without the causal determinacy of
middle-sized objects, as asserted in the Second Analogy,
I do not see how we could get the evidence we have for non-
causal relations among microscopic objects.
Although when first presenting his uncertainty principle Heisen-
berg seemed to think that the causal principle was no longer valid,
Lhysics and Philosophy he seems to agree with the above argu-
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ment:
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n the discussion of the Copenhagen interpretation of guantumtheory u has been emphasized that we use the c°asLarcor
qenlran
experimental equipment and moreg erally in describing that part of the world which does notelong to the object of the experiment. The use of theseconcepts, including space, time, and causality, is in factthe condition for observing atomic events and is, in thissense of the word, "a priori. "46
'
However Heisenberg goes on to assert that
What Kant had not foreseen was that these a priori concepts
can be the conditions for science and at the same time can
ave only a limited range of applicability Modern
P ysics has changed Kant's statement about the possibility
o synthetic judgments a priori from a metaphysical one into
a practical one. The synthetic judgments a priori therebyhave the character of a relative truth. 47
/
This brings up our main question concerning what kind of deter-
miniMlis being maintained by Kant's Critical philosophy. What does
Kant mean by calling nature, in the Third Antinomy, "that connection of
appearances determining one another with necessity according to univer
sal laws" and by saying, in the Second Analogy, that
there is an order in our representations in which the present,
so far as it has come to be, refers us to some preceding
state as a correlate of the event which is given; and though
this correlate is, indeed, indeterminate, it none the less
stands in a determining relation to the event as its conse-
quence, connecting the event in necessary relation with
itself in the time-series?^^
Or, to put it another way, how are we to understand the 'objectivity'
which the understanding, through its use of categories such as causal-
ity, legislates to experience? This question must be answered botoro
we can answer the question as to whether the quantum mechanics o(
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Heisenberg has made Kant's solution to the freedom-determinism prob-
lem irrelevant.
Heisenberg's remarks on Kant are not fully clear. However, from
the implications that he draws, namely that because a prior cause for
the emission of an a-particle from a radium atom cannot be found,
"Kant's arguments for the a priori character of the law of causality no
longer apply. he seems to be interpreting Kant's determinism as
implying that the modal status of specific causal laws is characterized
by some kind of a priori necessity. Given this Interpretation of Kant,
the indeterminacy principle, as Heisenberg and Margenau interpret it
(in contradistinction to Einstein and Planck), would deal a death blow
to Kant's view of causal determinism, dissolving the problem with
freedom as stated in the Third Antinomy. Heisenberg admits that the
use of the a priori concept of causality in a limited and practical sense
IS necessary, but a strong and universal determinism among events
has been empirically disproven by quantum mechanics.
I shall point out now, with the promise to expand later, what
Paton says in his discussion of the Second Analogy, which seems to me
quite on target:
for Kant what the mind thus imposes upon objects is the uni-
versal law of necessary succession or causation. Particular
causal laws can be known only as a result of experience.
Their particularity belongs to the matter of experience, not to
its form. As such it must be due to things-in-themselves and
not to the knowing mind.^^
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Kant specifically states that the law of causality argued for in the Sec-
ond Analogy is a necessary law of our sensibility, and therefore a
formal condition of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily
determines the succeeding
. The controversial point is whether
Kant thought this somehow entails that if is the cause of E then
Ej and are necessarily connected.
As Charles Hartshorne states in "Freedom Requires Indeterminism
and Universal Causality", almost everyone agrees that every event has
Its causes, but "an indeterminist (as conceived in this article) rejects
a certain definition of ’cause', namely that it is a condition, or set of
conditions, from which only one outcome is possible, or from which,
in principle or ideally, the outcome is wholly predictable."^"^ The
question is, granted that this strong sense of causal necessity pro-
perly characterizes the Newtonian-Laplacian physics, does Kant's view
of causal determinism simply mirror this classical position, thereby
standing or failing with it? I shall argue that when Kant's view of
determinism is understood properly, in its transcendental or critical
sense, the quantum mechanics of the indeterminist school does not
invalidate the problem of freedom and determinism that Kant wrestles
with in his first Critique
.
(4) Kant's Causal Determinism as a Demand of Reason
Newtonian-Laplacian determinism in physics did of course have
its metaphysical counterpart in rationalism, especially in Spinoza and
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Leibniz. Although Leibniz tried to escape the logical necessitariani
of Spinoza, nevertheless both saw nature in terms of a substance
sm
ontology with an established destiny which flowed out of the divine
substance. The unity of nature had a cosmic grounding which stamped
the essence of each substance with strict necessity.
Hume undermined this dogmatic determinism by taking away the
substance ontology upon which it was based; human knowledge was
limited to a world of impressions. However, Hume, under his empi-
rical presuppositions, could offer no objective significance to the
causal concept since there is no impression of it. Facing this situa-
tion, Kant revolutionized metaphysical inquiries by adopting a new
philosophical methodology which he calls critical or transcendental:
^ ilQJ^scendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much
with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as
this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. To overlook
this critical approach when speaking of Kant is to overlook Kant com-
pletely.
Kant s inquiry into the concept of causality must be understood
in this critical spirit an inquiry which searches out the concepts
necessary for the objectivity of experience:
I therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause, as a
concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of expe-
rience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of
perceptions in consciousness in general; but I do not at
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all comprehend the possibility of a thing in general as a
°f cause denotes a condition
not at all belonging to things, but to experience. For
experience can be nothing but objectively valid knowledge
of appearances and of their succession.
.
.
Kant's views of natural necessity, or what can be called his "critical
determinism
, focuses not upon particular causal connections among
empirical things, but rather upon a way of thinking without which
an experience of nature would be impossible.
Specific empirical laws must be established for Kant by way of
inductive procedures--procedures upon which Kant never fully elabo-
rates
. The necessitarian character of these laws is not established in
this empirical manner but is rather prescribed "in accordance with uni-
versal conditions of experience
. It is important to the interpreta-
tion of Kant that I am trying to develop to remember that the categories
of modality, in this case, necessity, are not objectively synthetic
because they add nothing to the concept of an object of which they are
predicated. They are what Kant calls "subjectively synthetic" because
they indicate only the relationship that objects must have to the know-
ing mind. That is, they refer only to tlie action of the mind by which
the concept is produced.
Also, it must be understood that the principles of modality are
restricted to empirical thought--!
. e . they are concerned with real (not
logical) possibility, actuality, and necessity. In other words, they
refer to objects
,
not to mere thoughts
. In the Preface to the second
34
edition, Kant explains this distinction and thereby his opposition to
rationalism in the following way:
I can ihink whatever I please, provided only that 1 do not con-tradict myself, that is, provided ray concept is a possible
for the possibility of the concept, evenhough I may not be able to answer tor there being, in the sum
all possibilities, an object corresponding to it. But some-thing more is required before I can ascribe to such a concept
objective reality, that is real possibility; the former possl-bility IS merely logical.
In effect, what Kant is saying is that I can think God
. freedom, immor-
tality and even leprechauns to be possible, but this does not assure
them of re^ possibility, since they may be mere fancies of the imagi-
nation. We cannot make an object possible by mere thinking; therefore
possibility is real only when related to experience, and so too with
actuality and necessity. They have no application to objects beyond
experience
.
Furthermore, if we combine this limitation to empirical thought
\A^the fact that each of the categories of modality, like all the other
categories, must apply to aji objects of experience, such that every
object of experience is possible, and actual, and necessary, then we
realize that all the postulates are extensionally identical. In the dis-
cussion of the table of categories, Kant says that necessity is no
wider than possibility and actuality since it can be viewed as the
combination of the other two.^^ Also, Kant makes it quite clear that
possibility is no wider than actuality since it must be employed
empirically, and actuality is no wider than possibility since everything
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actual must be possible. “ From this it follows that if
a Is is present, then the other two must be there as well
one of the mod-
These points have led commentators such as Professor Kemp Smith
to criticize Kant by saying that "one and the same definition adequately
covers all three terms alike"^^-that is, that the three modals are
indistinguishable. But this is unsound, since the object has a differ -
er e^lation to tjiejnij^ to the particular modal aspect nndPr
ich it is viewed
. This is the important point relevant to my argu-
ment concerning how to understand Kanfs analysis of causal necessity.
Each modal is seen as determining existence in a different way accord-
ing to the specific interests of the understanding. The schemata of
modality suggest that to know the possibility of a thing x is to know
that X c^ happen, to know x's actuality is to know that x^ happen,
and to know x's necessity is to know that x had to happen. In this
light it seems to me Cassirer is exactly correct in saying that Kant's
"critical determinism"
says nothing as to the ground of things; it does not even refer
directly to empirical things as such. It is rather a principle
for the formulation of empirical concepts, an assertion and
a prescription as to how we should grasp and form our
empirical concepts in order that they may discharge their
task the task of the "reification" (Objectivierung) of
phenomena. If our concepts of causality fulfill this de-
mand, it is futile to seek another justification, an alleg-
edly higher dignity for them.°^
I, of course, admit that there is much room for confusion when
Kant speaks about the status of specific causal laws in their relation
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to the general principle of causality:
Even natural laws, viewed as principles of the empirical
rn?ces:uy°?nd1o
^
determine f suggestion of aation from grounds which are valid a priori and
one®anfa"u''w°th“
The laws of nature, indeed.
Pies of nnd; r a under higher prlnci-
sieHal
They simply apply the latter top cia cases ZfTn the field of appearance. These prin-
St/on T <=0"tains the con-ditio , and as it were the exponent, of a rule in general.
tte , ^‘"''ds under
A strong sense of causal necessity along the lines of Newton-
Laplace could easily be read out of such a passage, but 1 think such
an interpretation would be out of the spirit of what Kant really wants to
say. Kant is not saying that the necessity of the causal principle
somehow sanctions the reading of specific causal laws as necessary
as soon as empirical induction has done its work. Rather, the law of
causality is a necessary principle of the understanding that governs
our way of thinking about natural events and their relations. Natural
laws are applications of the transcendental principle in that they must
employ the concept of cause, since without it, if the Second Analogy is
correct, there would be no objective experience at all. However, as to
the status of their lawlikeness
,
this is a matter for induction. The
necessity that spills over into specific causal laws from the transcen-
dental causal principle is the necessity to think that the reason for
an event s existence is due to its being governed by rule. That
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science can find any such rule or that there really Is such a rule Is a
completely indeterminate matter.
Such an interpretation seems quite In tune with Kant's calling the
Analogies, as well as the Postulates, regulative principles, as dis-
tinct from constitutive. The concept of cause is "only a rule accord-
g o which a unity of experience may arise from perception. It does
not tell us how mere perception or empirical intuition In general itself
comes about. Gerd Buchdahl comes very close to capturing the
point 1 have been trying to make concerning Kant's theory of causality
for thoorotical roason when he says
that the 'justificational force' of the concept of causality is
exhausted in the process of generating the possibility of
contingent judgments of experience concerning a sequence
of states. Any further relevance it may have, above all for
empirical science regarded as a system of causal laws,
must be a separate matter.
. . .
^^
At this point someone might grant that this may be the proper
interpretation of the work of the understanding in the Transcendental
Analytic, but nevertheless argue that somehow Kant smuggles in a strong-
er sense of causal determinism with the Dialectic's concern over free-
dom which is evidenced by a statement like the following:
. . .if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances
of men's wills, there would not be found a single human
action which we could not predict with certainty, and recog-
nize as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent condi-
tions
.
And only because Kant believes in the ancestral causal necessity of
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events in the spirit of Newton and Laplace does he see a problem with
freedom
.
But, I think, this is to misunderstand what Kant is saying in the
Dialectic about the function of reason in its relation to the understand-
ing—a relationship which brings Kant's "critical determinism" to its
climax. We have discussed the concept of causality as a principle
of the understanding and found that it is a necessary presupposition
for generating experience of objective contingent events, but we have
not discussed it with regard to experience in its total unity, that is,
in relation to nature as an interconnected system of appearances.
At this point we find reason discharging its function-
Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality inthe employment of the concepts of the understanding
,
and
endeavours to carry the synthetic unity, which is thoughtin the category, up to the completely unconditioned
Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employ-
ment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter
contains the ground of possible experience (for the con-
cept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable
in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned),
but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its
direction towards a certain unity of which it has itself no
concept, and in such a manner as to unite all the acts of
the understanding in respect of every object, into an
absolute whole, ' ^
Reason serves to complete the work of the understanding by seek-
ing the unconditioned "viewed as consisting of the entire series in
which all the members without exception are conditioned and only
the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This is essen-
tially the deterministic picture that the antithesis of the Third Antinomy
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puts forth.
Although reason doesn't create any concepts of Us own, ft can
extend a concept of the understanding, such as causality, beyond its
empirical limitations by freeing it from its schematic employment.
Such an extension enables reason to think the totality of conditions in
terms of a synthetic unity. This unconditioned is not a mere aggregate
of conditions but, rather, the idea of an ordered system of nature--a
system conceivable because of reason's thinking that the functions of
the understanding are applicable to all appearances. Reason, there-
fore, is charged with the task of unifying the work of the understanding
by providing a framework within which the search for causes can be
systematically and indefinitely continued. In this way reason regu-
lates the continuing scientific investigations of the understanding just
as the category of causality regulates our way of thinking about events,
neither prescribing anything concerning the status of specific empiri-
cal laws, except the manner in which they must be investigated. Kant
describes the relation between the understanding and reason in the
solution to the Third Antinomy:
1 he principle of the causal connection of appearances is
required in order that we may be able to look for and to deter-
mine the natural conditions of the natural events, that is,
to say, their causes in the ^flield of appearance_J^. If this
principle be admitted, and be not weakened through any
exception, the requirements of the understanding, which in
its empirical employment sees in all happenings nothing
but nature, and is justified in so doing, are completely
satisfied; and physical explanations may proceed on their
own lines without interference.^^
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Kant Is not saying that science will discover in the final analy-
sis, or would discover if it had the knowledge, all empirical laws to
be necessary in the Newtonian sense. Rather, as Buchdahl puts it,
"science regarded as 'theoretical reason' can only try and 'satisfy' the
'requirements' of the understanding; and that it tries to satisfy these
requirements by subjecting Itself to the requirement to search for
causes. This search can only be "set as a task"^5__^
successful end we cannot anticipate. Such a search is made possible
by the regulative principle of reason which poses this "as a problem
for the understanding, and therefore for the subject, leading it to
undertake and to carry on, in accordance with the completeness pre-
scribed by the idea, the regress in the series of conditions of any
given conditioned."^^
Kant refers to this function of reason as hypothetical in that the
universal extension of the principle of causality is put forward as a
kind of explanatory model upon which an investigation of particular
instances can be systematically carried out. Reason posits "a certain
collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding.
which otherwise are concerned solely with distribution unity. The
universality of the model can never be proven since we can never know
all of the possible instances that fall under it. Furthermore, to dis-
cover empirically that there are certain instances which do not accord
with the model does not necessarily invalidate the legitimacy of the
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model; in fact, their very discovery may have only been possible through
the use of the model. The hypothetical use of reason attempts to give
our knowledge a systematic unity but a unity which is, for Kant,
only a projected unity, to be regarded not as given in itselfbut as a problem only. This unity aids us in disco "rinraP inciple for the understanding in its manifold and specialodes of employment, directing its attention to cases whichare not given and thus rendering it more coherent ^8
Such a "critical determinism" which states that it is a necessary
feature of our jsnpwledge of nature that we employ the principle of
causality in our explanation of events is far different from the physical
determinism of the Laplaclan spirit. In fact, Laplacian determinism is
out of harmony with the critical spirit in that it extends knowledge
beyond its empirical limitations. "Critical determinism" charges
science with the task of searching for causal laws which will serve as
the ground for the explanation of events. By so doing it focuses upon
a question of scientific methodology which Karl Popper has answered
in a like-minded way:
The belief in causality is metaphysical. It is nothing but a
typical metaphysical hypostatization of a well justified
methodological rule—the scientist's decision never to
abandon his search for laws .... there could not be an
empirical statement having methodological consequences
which could compel us to abandon the search for laws.
For a statement supposed to be free from metaphysical ele-
ments can have indeterminist conclusions only if these are
falsifiable. But they can be shown to be false only if we
succeed in formulating laws
,
and in deducing predictions
from them which are corroborated And this means
that we ought to search for laws and predictions. Thus we
cannot obey an exhortation to abandon this search without
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repudiating the empirical character of these hypotheses This
m°Ilarh“ seif-contradictory to tMnh that a’nypinc l hypothesis could exist which might compel us toabandon the search for laws
.
^9 ® *°
Although Kant's "critical determinism" says something even stronger
about the causal principle, namely, that it is necessary for our having
objective empirical experience at all, it nevertheless seems to me that
Kant would be In essential agreement with Popper's statement if we
read it as speaking to reason's extension of the principle in order
provide an order of nature.
i(j
If the interpretation of Kant that I have been trying to give is on
the right track, I think there are at least three reasons why Kant's solu
tion to the problem of freedom and determinism in the Transcendental
Dialectic is still relevant. First, the interpretation of quantum theory
and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is still open to debate as wit-
nessed by the reluctance of Einstein and Planck to accept any indeter-
minist consequences and, more recently, by Debroglie who has con-
verted to a determinist point of view.^^
Secondly, if Heisenberg is correct that his principle implies an
indeterminism with regard to some events, I find that this in no way
invalidates what Kant says about the principle of causality and its
extension by reason. In fact, this indeterminism even seems to presup-
pose a causal determinism when interpreted in Kant's critical or tran-
scendental sense. Also, Kant would agree with Heisenberg in seeing the
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impossibility of separating objective reality from the acts of the observ-
er, since we might describe the Critical philosophy as seeking the
objectivity of subjectivity. Long before quantum mechanics Kant
realized that man should not be seen as a mere spectator, but rather
as an actor, and that, because of this Copernlcan revolution, scien-
tific explanations had to be reinterpreted In the Critical spirit and
ontology had to be recast into the framework of transcendental idealism.
However, this view of man as taking an essential part in the formation
of his world in no way conflicts with Kant's "critical determinism", but
rather is the key to its formation.
Furthermore, Kant's determinism says nothing about the modal
status of particular events; this is an indeterminate matter. Rather,
the necessity Kant's determinism imposes is upon our way of knowing
these events. It demands that the scientific mind approach nature
searching for causal laws, for without such a transcendental principle
there would be no objective understanding of experience nor would
there be any systematic unity to scientific work. Although there is
somewhat of a loose fit between the necessity imposed upon experience
by the understanding and its extension by reason, nevertheless I think
it is true to say for both that the necessity imposed is not that we
must "necessarily find " events that are lawfully related but "the neces-
sity is that we enquire for them. Furthermore, to locate freedom
in the gaps left open in this search is analogous to the traditional
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argument that makes room for diety at the points where
nations break down.
our natural expla-
Thirdly, even if contemporary physics had dissolved the problem
of freedom and determinism (a position I have been arguing against),
Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy would still be worth studying
because of the insight it gives to Kant's transcendental approach to the
different dimensions of man's being-in this case, the physical and
ethical dimensions. It allows us to see reason's dynamic at work as it
maps out different frameworlts according to its different purposes
. We
have already seen this dynamic at work in what we have called Kant's
critical determinism "--a position which I hope will become even
clearer in our exploration of Kant's solution
. To tip my hand Just a
bit, 1 think we shall find reason carving up reality into different levels
of being—levels which are marked off by the purposes reason must
serve
.
CHAPTER II
AN interpretation OF KANT'S SOLUTION TO
THE THIRD ANTINOMY
(5) An Introduction to the Problem and a Key
to the Solution
The problem that the Third Antinomy poses and the question that
Kant'S solution attempts to answer is the following:
In
disjunctive proposition to say that every effect
world must arise eUher from nature or from freedom- ormust we not rather say that in one and the~same event, Tn
—
erent relations.
,
both can be found? That all events
e sensible world stand in thoroughgoing connection in
accordance with unchangeable laws of nature is an estab-ished principle
^
the Transcendental Analytic, and allows
no exception Rant's "critical determinism" 7. Thequestion, therefore, can only be whether freedom *is com-pletely excluded by this inviolable rule, or whether an effect
no wit standing its being thus determined in accordance with
nature, may not at the same time be grounded in freedoml
Or, to put it another way:
Admitting that in the whole series of events there is nothingbut natural necessity, is it yet possible to regard one and
the same event as being in one aspect merely an effect of
nature and in another aspect an effect due to freedom; or
IS there between these two kinds of causality a direct con-
tradiction?
In unpacking what Kant means by "in different relations" and "in dif-
ferent aspects," we shall, I think, find the key to Kant’s solution and,
thereby, gain real insight into Kant's understanding of the purposes
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and power of the mind's rational activities.
s we noted earlier, reason, in its search for the unconditioned,
not only tries to remain loyal to the functions of the understanding by
supporting the universality and necessity of the principle of causality
for all of nature, but it also seeks an unconditioned causality which
will serve as the ground of conditioned events.^ Reason is naturally
led to this transcendental idea of a free cause-that is, of a power
which will serve as the spontaneous beginning of an event, acting
independently of empirical determinations
. In the empirical employ-
ment of the regulative principle of reason the demand is to extend the
concept of causality so that it is always possible to seek higher and
higher conditions in the series. The rule involved states that "however
far we may have attained in the series of empirical conditions, we
should never assume an absolute limit, but should subordinate every
appearance, as conditioned, to another as its condition, and that we
must advance to this condition."^ But reason cannot fulfill itself
through this function alone. The unconditioned that will allow reason
to find a satisfactory resting place cannot be an unlimited totality of
interconnected conditions, but an unconditioned that serves as the
origin and limits of conditions
. This is an idea resulting from the
extension of the concept of cause for the purposes of pure cosmologi-
cal speculation rather than from the demands imposed by theoretical
science. In both reason is trying to unify the work of the understanding.
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since that is its only object,^ but in each case it explores different
dimensions to find this unity.
The thesis and antithesis of the Third Antinomy can be inter-
preted as claims of pure ^matism and empiricism respectively
.
^
Each seems to have advantages over the other. By referring to free
causes which serve as "foundation stones of morals and religion,"^
dogmatism affirms a practical interest-an interest for which pure
empiricism can find no room. Dogmatism also has a speculative inter-
est in that it grasps an unconditioned from which the entire chain of
conditions can be derived. Therefore "it finds comfort in such con-
cepts, and at the same time a fixed point to which the thread by which
It guides its movements can be attached," while, on the other hand,
pure empiricism finds itself in a "restless ascent from the conditioned
to the condition, always with one foot in the air. However pure
empiricism has its own beauty. It demands that the understanding work
within its own proper domain, namely, that of possible experience.
There is no necessity to leave the chain of the natural order
and to resort to ideas, the objects of which are not given,
because, as mere thought-entities, they can never be given.
Indeed, the understanding is not permitted to leave its proper
business, and under the pretence of having brought it to
completion to pass over into the sphere of idealising reason
and of transcendent concepts— a sphere in which it is no
longer necessary for it to observe and investigate in accord-
ance with the laws of nature, but only to think and to invent
.
in the assurance that it cannot be refuted by the facts ^f
'
nature.
. .
.1*^
But it is because of these interpretations of the thesis and anti-
thesis of the Third Antinomy that no solution to it has been found. The
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very principles of pure empiricism makes any meaningful inquiry beyond
experience impossible, thereby
"betraying the same lack of modesty"
of which it charges dogmatic rationalism.“ Dogmatism, finding
experience quite unsatisfying and untrustworthy, deduces knowledge
of nature from pure concepts alone, thinking "that it is possible to do
this without having first investigated in what way and by what right
reason has come into possession of these concepts.
tion to the Third Antinomy maintains that regarding both of these posi-
tions "a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality
here none is to be found. "13 That is, in attempting to answer the
questions posed by the cosmological ideas, in this case the absolute
completeness of the conditions of the origination of an appearance,
both positions have approached the question obtectivelv as if the
unconditioned which they seek could be given to them as an object of
knowledge. Both forget that the question concerns an idea of reason
to which no object can possibly be given. And, therefore, "so long as
we obstinately persist in assuming that there is an actual object cor-
responding to the idea, the problem, as thus viewed, allows of no
1 4
solution. " Rather than either an empirical or a dogmatic solution.
w
Kant puts forward what he calls the Critical solution which "does not
consider the question objectively, but in relation to the foundation of
the knowledge upon which the question is based. An understanding
of this Critical solution is what will occupy the rest of this chapter—
a
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solution which is, in fact, a dissolution when the thesis and antithesis
are viewed within the framework of the doctrine of transcendental ideal-
ism
.
(6) Some Misunderstandings of the Solution
Both Strawson and H. W. Cassirer argue that, in opting for the
possibility that both thesis and antithesis are true, Kant has not applied
the truly Critical solution to the Antinomy. According to Strawson,
Kant should have found the antithesis true and the thesis false, since
the thesis is maintaining that the series of causes can exist as a
whole while the antithesis is simply stating what Kant supposedly
already proved in the Analytic, namely, that "Every member of the
series which is actually 'met with' in experience.
. .must be taken to
have an antecedent cause. But not only does this fall into the
fallacy of interpreting the thesis dogmatically, it fails to realize that
the antithesis is also trying to answer a question raised by an idea of
reason, and, therefore, its interest goes beyond what was discussed
in the Analytic. Rather than employing the true Critical solution,
Strawson seems to interpret both positions objectively, deciding arbi-
trarily in favor of the antithesis. The Antinomy is a problem raised by
reason which deals only with ideas; therefore such a problem cannot
be solved by simply referring to principles at work for the understand-
ing which deals with objects. In fact, reason's very purpose is to
unify the work of the understanding
— a purpose which can only be
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actualized by employing the ideas of reason regulativelv
. if one
adopted Strawson's solution to the Antinomy, the positive implications
for metaphysics that are established in the Dialectic would be over-
looked
.
H. W. Carrirer thinks that Kant should have found both thesis and
antithesis false in the Third Antinomy, Just as he did for the first two.
That is
,
he should
have sought to show that both parties in the dispute were
radically mistaken. In the one case it is assumed that the
series containing all the conditions of a given phenomenon
terminates in a first member, while, in the other, it is
assumed that it consists of an infinity of members. Neither
assumption is tenable, by reason of the fact that no signi-
ficant statement can be made about the totality of a series
of conditions '
The only reason, according to Cassirer, that Kant does not carry out
this properly Critical method of attack, as he did in the first two
Antinomies, is because he mistakenly thinks that the cosmological con-
flict of the Third Antinomy "is one between natural necessity and moral
freedom." Or, at least, he anticipates that the possibility of moral
freedom is at stake in the Antinomy. This, argues Cassirer, is the
reason he constantly confuses in his solution transcendental freedom,
which is what the thesis is truly about, with moral freedom.
I find this criticism by Cassirer two-pronged. First he finds no
reason why Kant should not have answered the Third Antinomy in the
same way as he answered the first two, and, second, he points out the
reason why Kant was misled. Both of these discussions seem to me
to be wrong. Concerning Cassirer's second point, rather than confus-
ing moral with transcendental freedom, Kant explicitly distinguishes
the two at the very beginning of his solution.'
^ And although he does
note that the possibility of practical freedom does depend upon tran-
scendental freedom, since practical freedom is asserting a causality
of our will which can act independently of natural cause to bring about
spontaneously a temporal event, this does not mean, nor can 1 find
any passages that would lead me to believe, that Kant thinks the con-
flict of the Third Antinomy is one between moral freedom and natural
necessity. In fact, Kant states in the Canon, which can be seen as a
transition to the second Critique
. that
The question of transcendental freedom is a matter for specu-
lative knowledge only, and when we are dealing with the
practical, we can leave it aside as being an issue with which
we have no concern. Moreover, a quite sufficient discus-
sion of it is to be found in the antinomy of pure reason.
The other prong in Cassirer's attack overlooks the import of Kant'
distinction between the mathematical and dynamical ideas^^--a dis-
tinction which exemplifies the difference between a constitutive and
regulative use of reason. The first two Antinomies are concerned with
a mathematical connection of the series of appearances of which
no other than a sensible condition is admissible, that is to
say, none that is not itself a part of the series. On the
other hand, in the dynamical series of sensible conditions,
a heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series,
purely intelligible and as such outside the series, can
be allowed
.
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In other words, in the case of the mathematical Antinomies, their very
nature forces them to think of "a mere Idea of absolute totality" in
terms of an object that cannot be given in any experience
.
"23 But
in seeking a mathematically unconditioned unity "no condition of the
series of appearances can be found that is not itself appearance, and
as appearance one of the members of the series. Therefore they
must pretend to operate under a constitutive principle of reason, which
would allow knowledge of an object beyond all possible experience,
when, in fact, there is no such principle. Any principle of reason is
reaiiiative only, serving as a rule for "the greatest possible continua-
tion and extension of experience, allowing no empirical limit to hold
as absolute" but not being able to tell us "what the object is. "25 h
regulates how "the synthesis must proceed from the conditioned through
all subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned. Yet it can never
reach this goal, for the absolutely unconditioned is not to be met with
in experience. "2 5 Because the dynamical Antinomies allow a non-
sensible condition of appearances in that they can be interpreted as
seeking an unconditioned which is not a part of the series, the regula-
tive principle of reason can be applied to them which shows both thesis
and antithesis to be possibly true.
To ward off any possible confusion, we should remember that
there is a difference between the constitutive-regulative distinction of
the principles of the understanding and of the principles of reason.
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Even though both the dynamical principles of the understanding and the
dynamical principles of reason are concerned with regulating an
object's existence rather than with constituting its magnitude,
the less the former are constitutive of experience (in that they render
the concepts objectively valid) whereas the latter can never be, "since
no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can ever be given.
This is obvious when we remember that ideas of reason are conceived
by freeing concepts of the understanding from all possible empirical
conditions
.
(7) An Attempt to Expose some Blind Alleys
One of the difficulties in understanding Kant's explanation of the
compatibility between transcendental freedom and natural necessity
results from the variety of ways in which he expresses himself. To
concentrate on only one of these ways, as many critics of Kant have
done, is to miss the full understanding of Kant's solution.
It is of course obvious to everyone who has dealt with Kant's solu-
tion that it cannot be separated from his transcendental idealism, "for
if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld.
Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of
29
every event. " To interpret the antithesis of the Third Antinomy along
the lines of pure empiricism, which holds the "fallacious presupposi-
tion of the absolute reality of appearances
,
is to leave reason in its
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antinomic conflict. Using time as a key, we learn from the Analytic
that only appearances stand under the condition of time and only that
which IS temporally determined must conform to the law of cause and
effect. Therefore, concerning that which is intelligible,
be^r chanoe“
noutn^, nothing happens in it; there cane no g requiring dynamical determination in time andtherefore no causal dependence upon appearances. Tnd con-sequently since natural necessity is to be met with only inthe sensible world, this active being must in its actions beindependent of, and free from all such necessity.
By attributing transcendental freedom to that which is not tem-
porarily conditioned certainly makes it compatible with natural neces-
sity, but no one, including Kant, would consider such a solution, as it
stands, satisfactory. Expressing such dissatisfaction A. C. Ewing
writes:
What IS easier to say than that the seif as thing-in-itself or
noumenon is free, and as phenomenon determined by natural
causality in all its actions. At first sight, at any rate, this
solution seems to come perilously near to being what Mr
Sidgwick described the solution of the third antinomy as tend-ing to become, that is, an explanation by saying that 'we
may also suppose an unknown relation to an unknown entity,
which is not a phenomenon, which might afford the required'
explanation if we only knew it.'^^
Besides appearing quite Pickwickian, such a solution would paint tran-
scendental freedom in negative terms, and, as Kant states, "This
freedom ought not.
. . to be conceived only negatively as independence
of empirical conditions. The faculty of reason, so regarded, would
cease to be a cause of appearances.
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This last statement introduces another necessary piece to the
puzzle, namely, a special kind of causality of which we have no knowl-
edge but of which we are nevertheless
"constrained to think," by the
very nature of reason itself, "as underlying appearances
. Such a
causality through freedom serves as the ground of appearances which
are its effects. Remembering that all appearances are necessarily
governed by the causal principle of the understanding and that there-
fore any other kind of causality must stand outside this series of
appearances, we are led to the following situation:
The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accord-ingly can be determined through other appearances, but its
causality is not so determined. While the effects are to be
ound in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible
cause, together with its causality, is outside the series.
Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its
intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appear-
ances as resulting from them according to the necessity of
nature.
Freedom and determinism are seen to be compatible here, since
we refer the sufficient cause of an event first to an intelligible and then
to an empirical cause. But rather than a solution this seems to be just
a side-stepping of the problem. In fact, it appears to be a mere re-
statement of the conflicting claims of the Third Antinomy, when what
is needed is an explanation of how just such a situation can be at all
possible, namely, how can one and the same event be both the effect
of a free cause and yet at the same time determined in accordance with
nature ?
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But if Kant is saying that and
,
which are in phenomenal
sequence and therefore governed by natural law, may be freely caused
by noumena Nj and respectively acting independently of each other,
doesn't this involve "the rather awkward conception of a pre-established
harmony between noumena acting independently? That is, it seems
that Nj and must somehow be harmonized if they cause E and E
^ 2
to fit properly into a deterministic framework. Or, to put Ewing's
criticism another way, it seems that the natural law by which E's
are governed reveals a harmony between the N's that are understood as
co-ordinate with E's. And if this is true, Kant would be inconsistent
with his own critical thinking which disallows any such intellectual
intuition into the nature of noumenal activity.
Such an interpretation of Kant's solution is misleading in at least
two ways. As I tried to develop earlier, Kant's "critical determinism"
doesn t depend upon any presupposition of noumenal activity but
rather upon a presupposition of our empirical knowledge. Regardless
of the noumenal nature of the cause of events, we can understand
them only as following from prior sensible causes according to rules.
This intelligible ground does not have to be considered in
empirical enquiries; it concerns only thought in the pure
understanding; and although the effects of this thought and
action of the pure understanding are to be met with in the
appearances, these appearances must none the less be
capable of complete causal explanation in terms of other
appearances in accordance with natural laws. We have to
take their strictly empirical character as the supreme ground
of explanation, leaving entirely out of account their
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intelligible character (that is, the transcendental cause ofheir^empirical character) as being completely unknown.
.
Furthermore, Kant in his reply to Eberhard comments upon his own
version of pre-established harmony which he finds "between what
follows from our notions of nature and what follows from our notions of
freedom. " It must not be seen as a harmony "between two different
things taken as external to one another" but rather "between two com-
pletely different powers in us having completely dissimilar principles."'’'’
In this last statement I think we have run across one of the keys for
solving the puzzle. Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy does not
depend on referring to two different things
, but rather on "conceiving
the faculty ,^of causalltyJZ possessed by an object of the senses" in a
"twofold manner. "
If, therefore, that which in the sensible world must be regard-
ed as appearance has in itself a faculty which is not an object
of sensible intuition, but through which it can be the cause of
appearances, the causality of this being can be regarded from
two points of view.
. . . We should therefore have to form
both an empirical and an intelligible concept of the causality
of the faculty of such a subject, and to regard both as refer-
ring to one and the same effect.
Take, for example, man who as one of the appearances of the nat-
ural world stands under the empirical laws, yet who at the same time
'knows himself also through pure apperception" or having a transcen-
dental self which must be presupposed as the ground of his empirical
self. This much we learned in the Analytic. Therefore, man "is thus
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to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand. In
respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to
the receptivity of sensibility, a purely Intelligible object. m
focusing upon what Kant means by these different 'powers' or 'facul-
ties' In a subject, which are the activities of reason Itself as It works
both With empirical concepts and with transcendental ideas according
to Its different principles, the importance of the following dark but
pregnant statement is clearly brought to light;
In this way freedom and nature, in the full sense of these
ac^tTons
without any conflict, in the samections, according as the actions are referred to their Intel-ligible or to their sensible cause.
(8) Reason's Explaining One Event from
Different Points of View
In order to help us understand what Kant is saying, I think it
would be interesting and helpful to cast Kant into the mold of a philoso-
pher of language who is offering us a revolutionary theory of semantics.
Although I wouldn't want to press this too far for fear of overlooking the
real metaphysical importance of the Critical theory,
I
don't think it
IS odd to see Kant in this role. For example, a fruitful way of under-
standing the controversial chapter on schematism in the Analytic is to
see Kant as introducing referential rules which govern the application
of concepts to objects of experience. Non-referential rules simply
govern the logical grammar of concepts, providing a theory of syntax.
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but when referring to extraiinguistic entities, we need, according to
Kant, both empirical and transcendental schemata serving as semanti-
cal rules of reference which will provide for empirical concepts and
categories their proper determinations in time/^ Without such
schemata "There certainly does remain in the pure concepts of the
understanding
... a meaning, but it is purely logical, signifying
only the bare unity of the representations. The pure concepts can find
no object, and so can acquire no meaning which might yield a concept
of some object.
Just as the understanding requires rules of reference to render its
concepts objectively valid, so there is needed a semantical theory for
reason's activities since it must refer both to theoretical and to specula-
tive dimensions as it serves to regulate the understanding. We might
say that we need rules for reason's metalanguage as it strives to
unify and explain the language of the understanding whose objects have
both an empirical and an intelligible character.
A contemporary theory of semantics having interesting parallels
to what Kant is saying in his solution is offered by Rudolf Carnap.
The main problem he is attempting to solve is how to make room for
both extensions and intensions
. His answer centers around the claim
that a variable has a dual reference--one to extensions, the other to
intensions. In fact, every sign in the object language has a dual
reference that, when translated into the metalanguage, can be read in
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either of two ways. In his conclusions Carnap states:
The formulations in terms of 'extension' and 'intension,'
class' and 'property,' etc.
,
seem to refer to two kinds of
entities in each type. We have seen, however, that, in
fact, no such duplication of entities is presupposed by our
method and that those formulations involve only a con-
venient duplication of modes of speech.
Carnap introduces the notion of a "neutral variable" which can be
read either extensionally or intentionally depending on how it is trans-
lated into the metalanguage according to certain rules. From the sLund-
point of the metalanguage, we judge which context the variable is in,
according to certain key signs, and then translate it accordingly.
Essential to this translation is the basic pragmatic question concerning
what purpose you are trying to serve in what context.
Although Kant would emphasize that the activities of mind are
primary to the structure of language, and, in fact, would no doubt
insist that the latter is understandable only in terms of the former,
nevertheless he too argues for the abandonment of the prejudice that an
individual must be interpreted from only one point of view. In the
Foundations Kant says
. . .
it is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy
to show that its illusion respecting the contradiction rests on
this, that we think of man in a different sense and relation
when we call him free, and when we regard him as subject to
the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It must
therefore show that not only can both these very well co-
exist, but that both must be thought as necessarily united in
the same subject.
. .
Whereas Carnap speaks of a duplication of modes of speech, Kant
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analogously refers to a duplication In the activities and powers of rea-
son whose operations upon an individual depend upon the context with-
in which the individual is judged to belong. Kant seems to be asking
us to think of an event as a kind of "neutral variable" which waits to
be translated by reason into its metalanguage according to different
principles. If we are asking questions about an event as seen within
the "field of appearances, " that is, if we are carrying out purely
descriptive scientific investigations, then reason will perform Its
operations by appealing to empirical laws of nature. It will regulate
the work of the understanding by extending its concepts, such as cau-
sality, in order that the full picture of "critical determinism" may be
seen.
So far, then, as regards this empirical character there is nofreedom; and yet it is only in the light of this character that
man can be studied— if, that is to say, we are simply
7
-
bservinq
,
and in the manner of anthropology seeking to
institute a physiological investigation into the motive causes
of his actions
But if "we ascent from the empirical object to the transcendental" and
ask our questions from this context, then "we find that this subject,
together with ail its causality in the ofJ7 appearance, has in its
noumena certain conditions which must be regarded as purely intelligi-
ble.
Man is certainly conscious of his empirical nature; "Yet beyond
this character of himself as a subject made up, as it is, of mere appear-
ances he must suppose there to be something else which is its ground—
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namely, his Ego as this may be constituted in Itself. "52 That reason
realizes the need for such a grounding is indicated by its search for an
unconditioned that is free from all empirical conditions. Reason is
never fulfilled in the empirical realm and, therefore, by its very nature,
seeks out intelligible origins for things.
Tbe^na jhat'h''; point of view asei g t belongs to the sensible world, I shall have torecognize that, gua intelligence
,
I am subject to the law ofhe intelligible world-that is, to the reason which co^ainsthis law in the Idea of freedom,
, ,
It seems to me the approach Kant takes in his solution comes very
close to what some modern philosophers are doing in their defense of
compatlbilism as a solution to the problem of freedom and determinism.
Take, for example, the specific case given by Kant, namely,
... a malicious lie by which a certain confusion has been
caused in society. First of all, ... we trace the empirical
character of the action to its sources, finding these in
defective education, bad company, /~etc.J.
.
. . We pro-
ceed in this enquiry just as we should in ascertaining for
a given natural effect the series of its determining causes.
But although we believe that the agent is thus determined,
we none the less blame the agent. ... Our blame is
based on a law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause
that irrespective of all the above-mentioned empirical condi-
could have determined, and ought to have determined.
the agent to act otherwise.^
~ ~ ^
At first glance such a statement seems utterly confused, for how would
the liar have done otherwise if his act of lying was empirically deter-
mined by prior events ? And to argue for the compatibility of these two
views by saying that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to
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do otherwise certainly seems to be at best an evasion. According to
Chisholm the only way that such a solution could possibly work is if
the statement "He could have chosen to do otherwise" were true, which
it is not according to determinism . ^5 However, I think, Chisholm does
not make any sense out of the above solution because he fails to see
that 'could have' statements can be used in different senses.
Aune in his article "Abilities, Modalities and Free Will"^® speaks
insightfully to this very point. There is what Aune calls "the ability
sense of 'could'" whose logic in no way conflicts with determinism.
Even though the liar's act of lying was determined by causal antece-
dents, we still might refer to his ability to have done otherwise in the
circumstances, which implies that he could have done otherwise if he
had wanted to. Involved in this statement, Aune argues, is another
sense of 'could' which entails that the liar could not have done other-
wise. Take the case of Jones, a robber: Even though he might have
had the ability not to steal.
given his actual wants at the time, he could not have exercised
this ability because it was physically impossible for him to do
so.
. . .In Jones's case his state of mind prior to the rob-
bery made it impossible for him to exercise his ability to walk
away instead; and thus
,
though he may indeed have walked
away had he really wanted to, it seems that, given his resolve
to rob the store, it was impossible for him to try to walk
away and hence impossible for him actually to walk away.
And if this was impossible, there is a sense, though it is not
the ability sense, in which he could not have walked away.
Perhaps this is the sense of 'could' that agitates the imagi-
nation of the libertarians.^^
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But, as Aune points out. If this is the sense of 'could' which causes
the libertarians to say that Jones could not have done otherwise, then
it has no bearing upon the free will question, but only concerns the
conditions, including his actual wants and resolves, that led up to
an event's happening. ^8 Important to remember in this regard is the
difference between causation and compulsion. To think that an event's
happening was causally determined by other events does not imply
that it was fated to happen— a position from which I have tried to
divorce Kant's "critical determinism.
It seems to me that Aune's position can be seen as essentially
Kantian--especially when we interpret the ability sense of 'could' that
he speaks of as the ability or power of reason which is "completely un-
known, save in so far as the empirical serves for its sensible sign."^^
Again it depends upon the framework within which we are asking our ques-
tion. If we are seeking a purely physical explanation of an event's com-
ing into being, then we do not have to leave the realm of the empirical for
our answer. But, even though "all that has happened in the course of
nature, and in accordance with its empirical grounds must inevitably
have happened, we still might ask the question whether it ought to
have happened
. Such a question is meaningful only when we recog-
nize that reason s causality has a dual reference such that even though
reason may be asserted to have causality in respect to appear-
ances, its action can still be said to be free, even though its
empirical character (as a mode of sense) is completely and
65
necessarily determined in all its detail. This empirical char-
acter is itself determined in the intelligible character (as a
mode of thought.
Davidson in his article "Mental Events" captures this Kantian
line quite well in the following statement:
Two features of mental events in their relation to the physi-
cal—causal dependence and nomological independence ,
freedom from deterministic lawsJ7“~combine ... to dissolve
what has often seemed a paradox, the efficacy of thought and
purpose in the material world, and their freedom from law.
When we portray events as perceivings, rememberings, deci-
sions and actions, we necessarily locate them amid physical
happenings through the relation of cause and effect; but that
same mode of portrayal insulates mental events. . . from the
strict law that can in principle be called upon to explain and
predict physical phenomena .... We explain a man's free
actions ZT^yJ7 accounts of intentional behavior /^hic^ ope-
rate in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach
of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason
and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.
Davidson is referring to events which can be given either a physical or
a mental description depending upon how the events are being "por-
trayed"--descriptions which have utterly different meanings and con-
sequences. Kant, I am arguing, paints a similar picture by showing
"that since freedom may stand in relation to a quite different kind of
conditions from those of natural necessity, the law of the latter does
not affect the former. That is, even though the liar's lie can
be
understood as completely determined from a physical point of view,
he
nevertheless can be held blameworthy when the moral question is asked,
since, at that moment, "The action is ascribed to the
agent's intelligible
character
.
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John Silber in his article "The Ethical Significance of Kant's
Mlaion"66 argues that Kant's double-aspect theory as a solution to
the Third Antinomy is disastrous. In his section entitled "The Problem
of Two Standpoints" Silber says.
In order to resolve the Third Antinomy (and for other reasons
which we need not here consider) Kant decided, in the firstCritique
,
to bifurcate reality into the phenomenal world of
appearances and the noumenal world of things in themselves.
All events in the phenomenal order, he said, are necessarily
related in terms of the category of causality and are in prin-
ciple fully predictable. In the noumenal order, on the otherhand, free causes can express themselves.
. . . The "Two-
standpoints Theory" fails to support the facts of everyday
life unless one assumes that a pre-established harmony co-
ordinates the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. On the pre-
supposition that such a harmony obtains, there is nothing
incredible about the fact that whenever a murderer in the
noumenal order freely wills to kill a victim, a gun in the
phenomenal order is predetermined to go off in his hand.
But while the interworkings of the two orders seem no longer
incredible, nothing can lend credibility to the presupposition
itself. Kant, in discussing Leibniz, clearly indicates his
lack of sympathy for such, ad hoc solutions.
But to understand Kant's two-standpoint theory in this way is to
make the wrong kind of moves. In a sense it is to cast Kant into the
role of Cartesian dualist, thereby having two separate substances and
all of the problems of interaction that go along with such a bifurcation.
I am arguing that to understand Kant's solution demands that we com-
pletely reshape our thinking about the dynamics of mental activity and
its ramifications for the setting up of ontological frameworks. In a
very real sense there is a harmony between the phenomenal and nou-
menal realms, but certainly not one pre-established by God. Rather it
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IS a harmony that reason, due to the critical demands of its own essen-
tial nature, is required to establish in order to make sense out of and
unify its own investigations and activities.
Although I wouldn't want to press the analogy too far, I do see
some similarities between Spinoza and Kant along these lines. For
Spinoza there is one infinite system which can be looked at from dif-
ferent points of view. We can consider God ^ an infinite substance
with an infinite number of attributes or ^ an infinite system of modes.
And concerning the second framework we can consider any mode either
under the attribute of thought or under the attribute of extension.
That IS, there is not one system of minds and one system of bodies
a la Descartes but one infinite rational system with different frame-
works of explanation. The Cartesian problem of interaction is no real
problem for Spinoza a solution some have criticized as being merely
verbal. However, I would prefer to see Spinoza's solution as simply a
different way of conceiving rational activity. By framing one's language
within the appropriate model of explanation the problem simply does not
arise, and these models of explanation are the business of reason itself
as it attempts to investigate and understand the one infinite substan-
tial order
. The ontological differences between Natura Naturans and
Natura Naturata and between the infinite and external modes of God
under the attributes of extension and thought are legislated by the
essence of rational activity itself. It is this method which I see as
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having definite analogies to the Kantian program.
Essential to my interpretation of Kant's solution is the importance
of Kant's understanding of the regulative principle of reason. Silber
makes reference to this regulative principle but mainly as it is impor-
tant to his teleological views of nature in the third Critigue-a position
Srlber interprets as "an alternative solution to the Third Antinomy on
the basis of the limitations of natural causality and the regulative
employment of finality. "68 i
stand Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy, the regulative principle
of reason must be seen as of fundamental importance. Furthermore, I
shall argue against the view that Kant changed his mind in the third
Critique
, because I see what he is saying there as being in perfect
agreement with the solution he offers in the Critique of Pure Reason .
I
(9) The Importance of the Regulative Principle
of Reason to the Solution
Kant is attempting to make room for both freedom and natural
necessity by revealing the dynamics of our rational activities which
may exist in polar tension but not, when employed properly, in antino-
mic conflict. Conflict arises when the principles of reason are not seen
as regulative but as constitutive and, therefore, employed as objective
principles. Principles of reason are subjective principles, called
maxims, "which are derived, not from the constitution of an object but
from the interest of reason
. When the principles of reason are
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tin^ULj UL ,
Both critical determinism" and transcendental freedom are
erests ot reason. And reason attempts to satisfy both by translating
events, which are otherwise neutral, into its metalanguage according
int f
to different principles. This metalanguage of reason might be sche-
Depending upon what context an event is in, a context which is actually
marked out by the interest of reason, this event will be translated by
reason into either or which are explanatory models. If we are
seeking a purely empirical explanation of an event, then reason never
leaves R^ which operates according to principles which provide, for
the understanding, a unified system of nature within which to work.
^2 P'^ovides the concept of causality with a framework within which it
can achieve its greatest possible empirical extension. R2
,
therefore,
is that idea of reason which is analogous to a schema of sensibility in
that it serves as "a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all
71
employment of the understanding." The difference between R2 and a
matized in the following way:
R
N
N
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sensible schema is "that the application of the concepts of the under-
standing to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object
Itself (as IS the case in the application of categories to their sensible
schemata)
.
"^2
If reason, on the other hand, is seeking an unconditioned ground
of conditions, then it operates within the framework of
,
making
framework transparent. As Kant says in the second Critique
. "it
has been sufficiently proved in another place /liamely, the first
Critique^/ that if freedom is attributed to us, it transfers us into an
intelligible order of things. Here again reason is seeking unity,
and here again we must be careful to remember that R^ is formed from
reason's own purity. Although Kant refers to "an intelligible order of
things, R^^
,
like R^
,
is really only an idea of reason through which it
attempts to fulfill itself.
We misapprehend the meaning of this idea if we regard it as
the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing, to
which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the systema-
tic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground
which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent con-
stitution is left entirely undetermined; the idea is posited
only as being the point of view from which alone that unity,
which is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the
understanding, can be further extended. In short, this
transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative
principle by which reason
, so far as lies in its power,
extends systematic unity over the whole field of experi -
ence
.
Kant refers to an "intelligible order of things" and a "phenomenal order
of things" because "reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise
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than by giving to the ide;i nf this unity an object. " However
"this
Object, as thus entertained by reason
... is a „ere idea; it is not
essayed as a somethin, that is real absolutely and i,j^,
,,, ,3
postulated only problematically."^^
When reason is recognized as regulative in the above manner the
antinomy dissolves. In the section of the first rrii-irtm i C tique entitled "The
Regulative Employment o£ the Ideas of Pure Reason" Kant speaks of dif-
rent thinkers being 'more particularly interested" in different prin-
ciples of reason according to which they make Judgments. "Each
believes that his Judgment has been arrived at through insight into the
object, whereas it really rests entirely on the greater or lesser attach-
ment to one of the two principles,
" which are not based on objective
grounds "but solely on the Interests of reason. m the Third Antinomy
Kant is not referring to different thinkers but simply to reason Itself
which can avoid stepping into antinomic pitfalls once it realizes its
regulative employment. Such an employment gives it the power to oper-
ate according to different principles and, therefore, to see one and the
same event from different points of view. And all of these operations
are done in the name of systematic unity. Within this regulative
employment even Leibniz's "law of the continuous gradation of created
beings" has a place. It is true that
. . . observation and insight into the constitution of nature
could never justify us in the objective assertion of the law.
. . On the other hand, the method of looking for order in
nature in accordance with such a principle, and the maxim
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hich prescribes that we regard such order-leaving
, howeverundetermined where and how far-as grounded in nature as suchIS certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative principle In
'
beyond what experience orobservation can verify; and though not itself determining any-thing, yet serves to mark out the path towards systematic unity.
To bring out even more clearly the importance of this regulative
nature of reason, which I find to be the key not only to his "critical
determinism" and its compatibility with transcendental freedom but also
to his practical and teleological principles, I shall conclude this chap-
ter with a discussion of a criticism by Ewing. When one reads all three
Critiques
,
one is confronted with the puzzle of Kant referring to three
different kinds of causality--mechanical, practical and teleological,
which he takes a great deal of time in trying to reconcile. Ewing
interprets the third Critique as very much a Kantian Parmenides
. In
1 790 Kant realizes that the mechanical causality he argued for in the
first Critique is insufficient for a full explanation of all events. In
§64 of the third Critique Kant recognizes that in the case of organisms
we must bring in the idea of self-creativity and purposiveness, remi-
niscent of the Greek notion of "soul" and Whitehead's "actual entity. "
Kant's mistake, according to Ewing, is his failure to adjust his account
of freedom to fit this new found defect in his mechanical determinism.
It is because he makes a mechanical or quasi-mechanical
causality universal among phenomena that he has to separate
the noumenal from the phenomenal so completely, as the
timeless from the temporal. The awkwardness and obscurity
of Kant's solution comes, no doubt, partly from the diffi-
culties of the subject, but also from the fact that, because
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he supposed the only kind of nece<?<^itv to Kc. ^
ALTyUctot onT'“
" Tra-c^ndentar'*'nal tic not nly necessity but also 'natural' (quasl-
nomenrand ™l''«sally valid among phe-a a was consequently only able to secure freedom in
But if such an interpretation of the development of Kant's Critical
philosophy were correct, then it certainly seems strange that he would
make room for a principle of purposive unity in the first Critique itself
Reason in its search for the greatest systematic unity demands of itself
the postulation of a supreme being which serves as the unconditioned
ideal or archetype for the complete determination of all conditioned
79things. Kant explains in "The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic
of Human Reason" that
This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts
of reason, is the purposive unity of things
. The specula -
tiye^ interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all
order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of
a supreme reason. Such a principle opens out to our reason,
as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views
as to how the things of the world may be connected accord-
ing to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at
their greatest systematic unity. 80
And to approach nature from this teleological point of view in no way
conflicts with the universality of "critical determinism" when we pro
perly understand reason's regulative employment.
The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one and
only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can
therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it.
Thus if, in studying the shape of the earth
. . .
we assume
it to be the outcome of wise purposes on the part of an
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cue cjuuiuonai unity; we do not destroy the uniupon which reason insists in its empirical employment. 81
This idea of purposiveness in nature is like the idea of transcen-
and thought. They do not conflict with the Transcendental Analytic
because they do not claim extension of our knowledge beyond experience.
Rather, reason in its systematic thinking has the power and the respon-
sibility to postulate different models (frameworks, systems) within
which our understanding of nature can achieve its greatest possible unity.
And because each of these models has its own unique point of view
and purpose, one and the same event may be seen under different descrip-
tions. Actually, however, "reason has only one single interest, and
the conflict of its maxims is only a difference in, and mutual limitation
of, the methods whereby this interest endeavors to obtain satisfactions "82
This interest is the intrinsic harmony of reason with itself, since "pure
reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. " And this "unity of
dental freedom in that they are both thought by reason out o
purity in order to prescribe the greatest systematic unity to
f its own
experience
reason is the unity of system" which "does not serve objectively as a
principle that extends the application of reason to objects, but sub-
jectively as a maxim that extends its application to all possible empirical
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knowledge of objects. -83 This principle of systematic unity, which is
the guiding principle of reason through which all its interests seek
harmony, can be seen as having an "undeterminate
- objective employ-
ment, since, by postulating such a unity, albeit only hypothetical, it
strengthens and extends its own empirical employment, "opening out
new paths which are not within the cognisance of the understanding.
Rather than the Critique of Judgment being at odds with these
ideas of the first Critique, I find instead that it is in fundamental
agreement. In §70 Kant exposes an antinomy analogous in all respects
to the Third Antinomy of the Transcendental Dialectic. The thesis is
the maxim, received by reason from the understanding, that "All pro-
duction of material things and their forms must be estimated as possible
on mere mechanical laws" and the antithesis is the maxim that some
material products of nature must be estimated in terms of final causes.®
Now if these maxims of reason were interpreted as constitutive rather
than regulative, conflict would inevitably arise. But once it is under-
stood that "reason is unable to prove either one or the other of these
principles, that is, once it is understood that these positions are
subjective interests of reason arising from its purity for the purpose of
its own systematic unity, then no contradiction arises from maintaining
the truth of both. In fact, it is "an open question, whether in the
unknown inner basis of nature itself the physico-mechanical and final
nexus present in the same things may not cohere in a single principle;
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it being only our reason that is not in a position to unite them in such a
principle," therefore being compelled to act from a "subjective ground,
and not according to an objective principle of the possibility of things
in their inherent nature. The multiplicity of the principles of
reason, which provides its richness and power, at the same time is
the mark of its finitude, giving it a tragic awareness of its own essen-
tial lack of complete unity.
Because Ewing is unmoved by the dynamic of reason's regulative
employment, he is forced to interpret this teleological causality,
introduced by Kant as early as the first Critique and elaborated in the
third, "as a substitute for 'natural' causality" rather than as a supple-
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ment to it. That Ewing fails to feel the force behind Kant's regula-
tive dimension of reason, thereby forcing him to see the third Critique
as an alternative to the first, is evidenced by this statement: "If
causality (phenomenal) were regarded as equivalent to mechanism,
Kant would be bound to insist that it was quite impossible for teleologi-
cal principles to be valid of organisms.
But this is to miss completely Kant's critique of judgment; worse
yet, it is to miss Kant's critique of pure reason itself, under which his
critique of judgment falls. The principle of teleological judgment,
like all subjective principles of pure reason, yields no objective knowl-
edge
.
We are right, however, in applying the teleological estimate,
at least problematically, to the investigation of nature; but
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aMrrifarch^r P'^‘"<=iP‘e= °f observationn^d ese ch by analogy to the causality that looks to endswhile not pretending to explain it by this means. Thus it isan est^ate of the reflective, not of the determinate, judg-
This principle of judgment is part of our capacity for rational thought in
its search for systematic unity. Without judgment we could not systems
tize experience. As Kant states in his first introduction to the Critique
SlJlidament, the lawfulness furnished by this power of the human mind
® theoretical knowledge of nature nora practical principle of freedom; nonetheless it gives aprinciple for judging nature and investigating it in search
of the general laws of particular experiences, according to
which we must posit them to bring out that systematic
connection needful for coherent experience, and which wehave an a priori ground for assuming.
Such a principle, like other "Ideas" of pure reason, adds nothing to
philosophy as a "doctrinal system," but instead stems out of a "need
of ours" to search for and posit "a systematic kind of connection wher-
ever possible
.
Therefore, rather than agreeing with Ewing that Kant should have
revised his thoughts about freedom in light of the Critique of Judgment
.
I find what he says there perfectly in tune with his solution to the Third
Antinomy. In discussing antinomies of pure reason we must realize
that we are not "asking questions in regard to the nature of things, but
only such questions as arise from the very nature of reason, and which
concern solely its own inner constitution."^^ "Thus pure reason,
which at first seemed to promise nothing less than the extension of
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knowledge beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly under-
stood, nothing but regulative principles
, principles which are all
governed by what we might call the supreme principle of reason,
namely, that of systematic unity. The requirement to seek for this unity
IS a necessary law of reason "since without it we should have no reason
at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understand-
ing
.
Kant s theories of causal determinism, causality through freedom
and teleological causality all must be seen as evolving out of this
necessary law of reason—a law which enables reason to reach beyond
its own finite conditionedness in its eternal restless search for the
unconditioned. The possibility of transcendental freedom is, therefore,
intimately joined to these self-transcending acts of reason which pre-
vent it from exhausting itself in totally limited and disunited concerns.
In such acts ideas of reason are born which serve to carve out a proper
home for Critical metaphysical inquiries.
PART II
FREEDOM AND ACTION
Introduction
Critique of Pure Reason Kant feels he has shown that free-
dom IS compatible with the determinism of natural causality by reveal-
ing the dynamic of reason's regulative employment. However, freedom
still remains a mere possibility, even though the recognition of it as a
transcendental Idea is necessary for the completeness of reason's invest-
igation of nature. To solve the riddle of the Critical philosophy, that is,
how categories of mind can be objectively applied to noumenal being in
practical use, the objective reality of the concept of freedom must be
justified. This is the chief task of the Critique of Practical Reason
.
In the foreward to his Commentary , ^ Beck remarks on the neglect
of the second Critique by Kantian scholars
. But as John Silber points
2
out, the explanation for this apparent neglect is due to Kant himself.
Many of the essential concepts of his moral theory are not fully explain-
ed in the second Critique
. The concept of obligation and the structure
of imperatives are quite extensively discussed in the Foundations ;
the concept of the good is given important treatment in the first and
third Critiques ; and most important for the purposes of this dissertation.
the concepts of moral freedom and the will are first systematically
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developed in the Religion Within the Limits of Ree.nn and in the
Metaphysics of Morals
. Therefore, although the second Critique is the
real climax of the Critical philosophy, it must be understood in light
of these other works
.
The justification of freedom turns upon the question Kant poses
in the Introduction: "Is pure reason sufficient of itself to determine
the will, or is it only as empirically conditioned that it can do so?
An answer to this question focuses upon the interrelation of freedom,
rationality, and sensibility. This in turn demands a theory of human
volition. Only then can we understand Kant's identification of the will
with practical reason,^ and thereby his explanation of free action.
What Kant attempts to do in the Critique of Practical Reason is to
uncover the principles that are required for the rationality of action.
This requires an analysis of practical reasoning that relates concepts
such as intention, desire, volition, and moral responsibility to funda-
mental categories of an adequate philosophy of mind. Even though the
current philosophical market is flooded with talk about action theory,
Wilfrid Sellars has perceptively noted the lack of any such analysis
of practical reasoning.^ I would argue that Kant has at least provided
the outline, if not the full picture, for this analysis with his justifica-
tion of the central practical concept of causality through freedom.
Such a concept brings out that sense of 'cause' in which it is
true to say that agents cause events, but that they are not caused to
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do them. This points to a sense of 'can' in "He can do otherwise"
which is not explainable in terms of physical laws; rather, it is explain-
able only by a set of practical principles governing purposive activity.
And under such a set of principles this sense of causality associated
with freedom is not a mere indeterminism for Kant; on the contrary
freedom of will, although it is not the property of conforming
to laws of nature, is not for this reason lawless: it must
rather be a causality conforming to immutable laws, though
of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be self-
contradictory.
This special law of causality, which is provided by pure practical
reason, is the moral law.®
The practical necessity of the moral law points to the concept of
obligation which is expressed in the morally significant statement "He
ou£ht to have done otherwise, " The transcendental justification of
freedom centers around the rational account Kant gives this concept—an
account many writers on Kant disagree with because of its apparent
circularity. In Part II I shall try to explain what Kant means by saying
that "though freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the moral law,
the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.
This relationship underscores the reciprocity between freedom and
reason. The moral law, which is a necessary law of free action, is
prescribed freely by pure practical reason. A proper analysis of this
relationship will show that Kant finds both freedom and obligation ulti-
mately grounded in reason.
cfsu“burthe°k block of all empiri-ists t the ey to the most sublime practical principles
necrsslrUvTrT^'H^'
^^rough it, that they mustcessarily p oceed rationally . ^
0
CHAPTER I
AN ANALYSIS OF KANT'S RATIONALITY OF ACTION
(1) Distinctions and Relations among
Practical Principles
If we asked the question "Why?" about the statement "I shall do
A" two different answers might be given: "Because I want B and A Is
the means to B" or "Because I ought to do A. " These answers point to
different kinds of practical reasoning. In the second Critique Kant
locates the practical principles underlying these two different reasons
for my Intending to do A, thereby providing a full theory of practical
reasoning
.
We might call this an attempt to give the rationality of action.
Sellars says "The central theme of Kant's ethical theory is, in our
terminology, the reasonableness of intentions. In what sense or senses
if any, can intentions be said to be reasonable, i.e. have a claim on
the assent of a rational being According to Sellars, Kant is trying
to answer this question by looking for practical principles that will
make the statement "I shall do A" categorically valid, rather than merely
hypothetically valid. To put this in more Kantian language, the second
Critique is a search for principles which are categorically prescriptive
of actions, being conditioned by nothing but pure reason itself. Such
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principles must provide the rational foundation for synthetic a priori
propositions which will explain the practical necessity between "think-
ing that one ought to do A" and "willing to do A, " that is between
normative rational thought and action. In the next few sections 1 shall
lay out some of the machinery essential to Kant's rationality of action-
machinery which is valuable to an understanding of what it means to
act freely for Kant.
Kant argues that the empiricist is unable to provide for the
rationality of action because he confuses maxims or subjective practi-
cal principles with la^ or objective practical principles
. In the
Foundations Kant identifies a maxim as
a principle on which the subject acts
. A law, on the otherhand, is an objective principle valid for every rational
being; and it is a principle on which he ought to act—that
is, an imperative
.
^ ^
Part of this empiricist confusion stems from an inadequate analysis of
the concepts of will and desire, although the deeper problem appears to
lie in the empiricist theory of concept formation itself.
Essential in understanding Kant's rationality of action is his dis-
tinction between the formal and material aspects of practical principles.
A practical principle" is a generic term referring to all those "proposi-
tions which contain a general determination of the will. The matter
of such principles is the object whose reality is desired. If the deter-
mination of the will is due to the relation this object has to the sub-
ject, namely one of expected pleasure, then the principle is empirical
.
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However, to provide for a complete theory of rational action. Kant
argues that one must uncover principles which
from the subject himself. To do thi
aspect of practical principles.
spring unconditionally
s one must refer to the formal
The form of practical principles deals only "with the universal
rules of thinking as such without regard to differences in its objects. "14
To study this formal aspect is to study the logic of practical reasoning,
and the laws associated with it are laws of freedom
. A study of empir-
ical practical principles might be called practical anthropology, but
this is not sufficient to account for the rationality of action. 15 only
by considering the form of practical principles can moral philosophy,
along with its concept of freedom, be established.
To act in accordance with principles is the mark of rationality
,
^ ^
distinguishing human action from mere animal behavior. But to get the
sufficient conditions for rational action an account of objective practi-
cal principles is necessary. Subjective practical principles or maxims
are principles upon which the subject chooses to act. They express
his own personal principles, if you wiJl, his life-style. H. J. Baton
calls them the "principles actually at work in our action, principles
which are the real ground of our action. An example is Quixote's
principle of action: "Whenever I come upon a wrong, I shall right
it, having under it several practical rules, for instance: "To
punish the enchanters who changed Lady Dulcinea into the form of a
peasant girl is to right a wrong
.
^
An objective principle is valid for every rational agent, and "would
also serve subjectively as a practical principle for all rational beings
if reason had full control over the faculty of desire. "19 Such principles
formulate the language of Impgratives prescribing what we ought to do.
But not all objective practical principles are practical laws, rather only
those which command the willing of certain actions to be our duty, to
be categorically valid.
We can now see more clearly the relation between maxims and
laws. Without maxims there would be no action, but unless the maxim
of my action is formed out of regard for a law, my action is not inten-
tionally moral. In order that my actions be categorically valid, "I
ought never to act except in such a way that 1 can also will that my
maxim should become a universal law.
Having put forth this much machinery, we can say that in the
second Critique Kant tries to explain the possibility of maxims which
are not empirical practical principles, and to aid such an effort, he
offers an analysis of imperatives which command either hypothetically
or categorically.^^ Such a distinction, which is a distinction of
imperatives, will help us to understand the two different answers given
to the question "Why should I do A?" As Beck points out in his article
"Apodictic Imperatives, this is how Kant really distinguishes
between imperatives, namely by the way they command, rather than by
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their structure. In the Preface to the second Critique
. Kant declares
that the modal concepts of the problematic, assertoric, and apodlctic
indicate the proper difference among imperatives
.
24
A hypothetical imperative is practically necessary in so far as it
IS conditioned by an end, B, to which the action. A, stated in the
imperative is judged to be a means. Such imperatives command either
problematically
,
if it is a technical imperative or rule of skill where
the end is what someone might desire, or assertorically
. if it is a
pragmatic imperative or counsel of self-love where the end is what
everyone naturally desires, e.g. happiness. 25 But both of these
hypothetical imperatives conform to the same analysis. As Kant states
in the Foundations, their possibility is easy to establish since they
are analytic as far as willing is concerned : "If I fully will the effect,
I also will the action required for it. "2 5
To understand what Kant means by the analyticity of willing
related to hypothetical imperatives, let us borrow another example from
the knight-errant Quixote. Given the hypothetical imperative "If one
wants to disenchant a Lady, then one ought to follow Death's method
of disenchantment" and the proposition "Quixote desires Lady Dulcinea's
disenchantment, " then "Quixote ought to will Death's method of three
thousand self-inflicted stripes on Sancho's 'browny buttocks'" follows
analytically. What is analytic here is the logic of the willing of a
rational being ,27 not the contents willed.
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The content of the hypothetical, namely that Death's method of
beating poor Sancho is required for the disenchantment of Quixote's
Lady, is certainly not known analytically, nor is the fact that Quixote
desires her disenchantment. Rather, Kant's analyticity of conditionals
IS actually a statement within his theory of the rationality of action.
Quixote's intention to bring about Sancho' s beating is reasonable rela -
tive to his desire for Dulcinea's disenchantment and his belief that
for this to come about Death's method is causally necessary. This is
true even though the content willed may in fact be quite unreasonable,
9S no doubt poor Sancho would roadily agr©6.^^
But in the second introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant
makes it quite clear that these technically-practical principles are
mere "corollaries'- to theoretical philosophy, since the kind of causal-
ity associated with them concerns concepts of nature. They are there-
fore not morally-practical.^^ To account for the second reason for my
intention to do A, Kant must explain the possibility of imperatives
which command apodeictically
, that is
,
without being conditioned by
any end other than the doing of the act for its own sake.
To say "I shall do A because I ought to do A" is to say "I shall
do A because the willing of A is an apodeictic command. " The sense of
"because" in these statements is different from the sense of "because"
involved in hypothetical imperatives. Both refer to practical reasoning
and to a causality of the will, but only the former is grounded in a law
of freedom.
The sense of obligation associated with each of these imperatives
is inseparable from a notion of aood action.
m
the second Critique
Kant says that the only objects of a practical reason are the good or
the evil. If the objective practical principle is merely a means to
some end, then the good which is willed is the useful
. Sancho's beat-
ing IS good for Lady Dulcinea's disenchantment. If the imperative is
prudential, then the good act is that which brings about my well-being
(desWghl). But unlike the sense of good in these principles of action,
Kant seeks another sense of good (das Gute) which is not conditioned
by anything outside the willing of this good in Itself. 33 Unlike the
skilfully good and the prudentially good action, the morally good
action is not based upon satisfying specific desires of the agent, but
solely "for the sake of the moral law."^"^
To assure this distinction between objective practical principles,
however, Kant must justify the use of categorical imperatives. These
laws of moral action issue apodeictic commands for the will to follow,
if it is to be a good will. But because these unconditional imperatives
are synthetic a priori practical propositions, their possibility is much
more difficult to establish than that of conditionals:
Without presupposing a condition taken from some inclination
I connect an action with the will a priori and therefore neces-
sarily.
. . . Here we have a practical proposition in which the
willing of an action is not derived analytically from some
other willing already presupposed
. .
. ,
but is on the con-
trary connected immediately with the concept of the will of
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a rational being as something which is not contained in this
concept
.
^
Kant realizes that the possibility of these imperatives of morality
cannot be established without the concept of freedom. But first he
identifies the criterion of lawlikeness for these imperatives and argues
that the phenomenon of moral obligation cannot be explicated if all
imperatives are merely conditional. This is the purpose of §§1-7 of the
second Critique which goes to the very heart of his rationality of action
and to the nature of reason itself.
(2) Kant's Theory of Rational Desire
Essential to this purpose is a correct analysis of the faculty of
desire-- the faculty such a being has of causing, through its ideas, the
reality of the objects of these ideas. The main question to be asked
in such an analysis is whether pleasure always serves as the ground of
the faculty of desire. If so, one need only engage in "a critique of con-
cepts borrowed from psychology," making the principles of action purely
empirical. Kant contends that because an empiricist, like Hume,
answers the above question in the affirmative, he is unable to account
for the concept of moral obligation, and therefore unable to give suf-
ficient conditions for the statement "S acts rationally out of his desire
that p. " This mistake centers around the empiricist philosophy of
mind which fails to include the normative dimension of thought.
According to the empiricist, concepts are meaningful only if
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they have their source in observation and can be analyzed only in terms
of impressions. Upon this empiricist theory of meaningfulness
, Hume
formulates principles of justified (or rational) belief and desire. A
Humean schema for the principle of rational belief is the following; S
believes rationally that whenever an event of type E occurs an event of
type El Will occur if and only if whenever S observes (has an impres-
sion of) an E-event, S also observes an e 1 event. What this says,
in effect, is that all rational belief in lawful regularities is based upon
observation of constant conjunctions among impressions. Following
this principle, when S observes an occurrence of an E-event, he can
justifiably expect an e 1 -event to follow. Hume’s rationality of action
follows this same pattern in claiming that all rational action out of
desire is simply based upon the regularity of observing a certain state
of affairs (having a certain impression) and the pursuing of another.
Such a claim has led many philosophers to give an analysis of
desire which identifies it with a recognizable pattern of behavior.
Russell, for example, argues that "an animal's desire is nothing but a
characteristic of a certain series of action" and from this "it is not
difficult to see that the same explanation is applicable to the desires
O Q
of human beings
. Hume would no doubt be quite agreeable to this
account, since in the Treatise he states that men and animals are
rational in exactly the same way.^^ For Hume, desire, like belief.
can be described only by way of reference to a succession of internal
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impressions. Russell simply expands this phenomenalistic account into
a behavioristic one, but the spirit is the same.
That animals are rational in the same way as man, although per-
haps differing in degree, is a direct consequence of the above schema
and is paradigmatic of the whole empiricist misunderstanding of the
nature of thought-in this case, thought as it relates to action. Acting
out of desire involves the notion of trying to realize some purpose
founded upon the pure thought of an agent. Such thought cannot be
reduced to either patterns of behavior or regularity among impressions.
Rather then being purely descriptive, thought is essentially normative—
a characteristic of mental activity which it would be absurd to attribute
to the mouse running for its hole whenever the cat is present.
In fact, Hume himself seems to realize that the concept of obli-
gation, which is essentially normative and basic to our conceptual
scheme, is recalcitrant to his way of establishing meaningful concepts.
^ghtness
,
along with the factual element of usefulness or pleasant-
ness, is fundamental, according to Hume, to a theory of value, but the
former cannot be observed. Therefore, as a result of his strict
empiricism, Hume must announce a scepticism concerning the use of
this concept. Because
This ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirma-
tion, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd;
and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be
a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.'^^
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In trying to give sufficient conditions for acting rationally out of
desire and in order to account for moral obligation, Kant sees the need
to distinguish between a lower and higher faculty of desire (das
Beaehrunqsveritioq en) by locating their different causal determinations.
Because an empiricist, like Hume, does not make this distinction,
he confuses maxims with laws. A statement of the lower faculty of
desire is hedonistic: S desires to do A because of the pleasure S
expects as a result of doing
analogue to the
above schema of Hume's rationality of action.
This lower faculty of desire is based upon what Kant calls "the
material of the faculty of desire" which is the desired object pursued
for its expected pleasure-giving capacities. Any practical principle
founded upon it will be empirical
, since we cannot know a priori if
the object sought will actually "be associated with pleasure or dis-
pleasure or will be merely indifferent. Also it will be a mere sub -
jective maxim, since it is not necessarily true that all rational beings
will find the object as pleasure-giving."^^ However this is not to say
that the presence of a material of desire disqualifies a principle from
being a law. In fact, Kant says explicitly that there must be an
object of every volition if there is to be action at all."^^ He simply
disqualifies as laws those principles that guide action because of
their reference to the material of desire. If actions were guided
because of such references, then
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the maxim could not be presented as giving universal law,
because then the expectation of the existence of the object
would be the determining cause of the choice, the depend-
ence of the faculty of desire on the existence of some thing
would have to be made basic to volition, and this depend-
ence would have to be sought out in empirical conditions
and therefore could never be a foundation of a necessary
and universal rule."^^
Kant is seeking a way of setting up practical laws which are valid
for any and all rational beings and which concern what morally ought
to be done rather than what i^done. As we have noted earlier these
practical laws must also be carefully distinguished from hypothetical
imperatives, since they, like the empirically subjective practical
principles, are relative to the material of the faculty of desire. In
the Canon of the first Critigue Kant even goes so far as to remove
hypothetical reasoning from the realm of practical reasoning altogether
in his effort to separate empirical and moral laws:
By 'the practical' I mean everything that is possible through
freedom. When, however, the conditions of the exercise of
our free will are empirical, reason can have no other than a
regulative employment in regard to it, and can serve only to
effect unity in its empirical laws. Thus, for instance, in
the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason con-
sists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed to us by
our desires in the one single end, happiness, and in co-
ordinating the means for attaining it. In this field, there-
fore, reason can supply none but pragmatic laws of free
action, for the attainment of those ends which are commended
to us by the senses; it cannot yield us laws that are pure
and determined completely a priori . Laws of this latter type,
pure practical laws, whose end is given through reason
completely a priori
,
and which are prescribed to us not in
an empirically conditioned but in an absolute manner, would
be products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and
these alone, therefore, belong to the practical employment
of reason, and allow of a canon.
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TO establish the possibility of categorical imperatives, Kartt must
locate a theory of rational desire whose objects are a priori determinable
such that the will is determined by purely formal principles of thought.
In other words, to establish principles of morality rather than princi-
ples of self-love, Kant must find a higher faculty of desire whose
determining ground must be discovered through "a relation of a concep-
tion to an object by concepts and not the relation of a conception to
the subject by feelings.
Kant notes that there have been attempts to distinguish between
a lower and higher faculty of desire on the basis of "whether the con-
ceptions which are associated with pleasure have their origin in the
senses or in the understanding
.
"52
^s Beck in his Commentary points
out, the otherwise acute men" Kant is referring to here are the
Wolffians whose reasoning, following Descartes and Leibniz, stems
from taking clarity as the distinguishing criterion between sensibility
and the understanding . ^5 Through the understanding man can gain an
intellectual intuition, and hence knowledge, into the very essence
of objects. This differs from the confused representations derived
from sensation, of which the principles founded upon the lower faculty
of desire are the practical paradigms.
As early as his Inaugural Dissertation Kant upholds a generic
distinction between the understanding and sensibility and recognizes
the above rationalist distinction as merely one of degree in clarity.
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not of kind.54 Upon this rationalist view it Is meaningless to speak
Of two kinds Of desire because the corresponding expected pleasures
determine this faculty in exactly the same way. Therefore, the only
questions to be asked by the man who is trying to justify his acting
out of desire is not whether the related pleasure Is intellectual or
sensuous, that is of a particular kind, but rather how great, how
satisfying, how long-lasting, and how much is the related pleasure.
It should be pointed out that Wolff himself speaks of the
rational idea of Eerfection of which pleasure is the necessary accom-
5 6paniment. He rejects hedonism by holding that the perfection is
desired for its own sake and not for the pleasure it gives. But,
as Silber makes clear, this will not escape Kant's argument. The
idea of perfection when used in a practical sense must refer to a given
er^ e.g. the perfection of a knife is determined by its competence
for cutting. The idea of perfection cannot determine desire unless cer-
tain ends are given from which perfection is judged, and according to
Kant
an end, however, as an object which precedes and contains
the ground of determination of the will by a practical rule--
that is
,
an end as the material of the will—is
,
if taken as
the determining ground of the will, only empirical; it could
thus serve for the Epicurean principle in the happiness
theory but never as a pure rational principle of ethics and
duty
.
For Kant, the higher faculty of desire has a completely different
structure and function from the lower, as does the understanding from
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sensibility.
Either, then, no higher faculty of desire exists, or else purereason alone must of Itself be practical, i.e. it must be ableto de^e^rmine the will by the mere form of the practical rule
Therefore, a statement of Kant's higher faculty of desire is the follow-
ing: S desires to do A because A has the form of lawlikeness. And
the principle of Kant's rationality of action is: S acts rationally out
of his desire to obey the rule: "Whenever an event of type E occurs,
an event of type should occur" if and only if the rule is a command
of pure reason. This says, in effect, that if a man were completely
rational, then every rule prescribed by pure reason would be acted
upon out of desire, where desire is simply the thinking that the rule
ought to be obeyed for its own sake, that is, simply because it is a
practical law.
61Contrary to Hume, Kant argues that reason directly influences
action and, therefore, can be the source of a theory of morals.
G. E. M. Anscombe feels there is a significant difference here between
Hume and Aristotle which, I think, has bearing on this explanation of
reason and action in Kant. For Hume, actions are done out of passions,
reason being inert; whereas in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says
r o
that reason does indeed play a role in action. However, the dif-
ference is not as significant as it might first appear, since Aristotle
qualifies this by saying that "intellect itself however moves nothing,
but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical. I
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relate this to what Kant refers to as hypothetical reasoning resulting in
universal rules of skill (how to find means to some end)
. . .as,
for example, how someone who wants bread should construct a mill. "64
And this kind of reasoning even Hume admits to be important in action
theory. But, according to Kant, such reasoning cannot issue in practi-
cal laws and, therefore, cannot provide the rationality of action.
In trying to develop the categorical validity of intentions as being
essential for the rationality of action, Kant is pointing to a completely
different conception of the nature of thought of which rational desire
is a part. Thought in its relation to the setting up of laws is self-
legislating, having, therefore, a formal and normative dimension which
differs from its empirical dimension. Through his theory of rational
desire Kant believes he has shown that thought's essence cannot be
captured in purely descriptive terms.
(3) A Vindication of Kant's Formalism in Moral Action
The criterion of categorical imperatives originates from this for-
mal dimension of thought. Kant states in the Foundations that "the mere
concept of a categorical imperative
. .
.
provides us with the formula
containing the only proposition that can be a categorical imperative
,
"66
namely "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time
will it should become a universal law ."^^ where "maxim" and "law"
are variables. Broad correctly calls this formula a "second-order
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principle- under which first-order principles or specific imperatives
fall. 68
This formula, which is an expression of man's pure rationality,
prescribes to the practical thinker a way of choosing his maxims,
namely, the maxim should be one that we can will to be a maxim for
any and all rational beings. The moral agent acts categorically rational
rather than merely hypothetically rational, only if he decides upon his
intention because it is unlversalizable, or as Sellars puts it, because
of Its being within a framework of intersubjectivity, rather than being
"irreducibly egocentric. A case of practical reasoning involving
egocentric intentions is an argument which is only hypothetically valid.
Quixote's practical reasoning concerning the disenchantment of Lady
Dulcinea is hypothetically but not categorically valid because Quixote
is acting out of his desire which is determined by a given end. This
is true even though the hypothetical imperative authorizes that anybody
would reason in the same way given the same conditions
. including
Sancho himself. For intentions to have an intersubjective form, as
Sellars calls it, and for arguments involving them to be morally good,
the intentions must not only be located within but must be formulated
because one is a member of a community of rational beings. Quixote's
maxim "Whenever I come upon a wrong, I shall right it" is categorically
valid only if it is formulated in this way. And, Quixote acts morally
rational when he, in his own singularity, acts as a member of this
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community, that is, when he acts from a moral point of view rather
than from a personal point of view. These are points of view Kant has
explained through his analysis of imperatives.
In a hypothetical imperative the content of the imperative, that
is, the value of the "A" in "I shall do A," is determined by the content
of the law of nature expressed as "A is the means to B. " But in a
categorical imperative the content of the imperative is determined by
the form of law as such, which is the criterion or formula for all cate-
gorical imperatives. This analysis of imperatives is reflected in
Kant's theory of will which also serves to explain what he takes to be
the moral point of view. Kant calls a willing which is determined
through hypothetical practical principles heteronomous
, whereas an
a^utonomous willing is based upon categorical principles grounded in
pure reason. To act rationally is to act autonomously, and from this
it follows that to try to escape the moral law is to try to escape one's
essential rationality. I shall be dealing with Kant's theory of will
extensively in my next section. I mention this distinction now only in
order to make as clear as possible the criticisms that have been directed
at this essential "formalism" in Kantian ethics, that is, the determina-
tion of the content of a maxim by its form.
The criticisms against Kant's formalism, or, to put this another
way, against his claim that the moral point of view is determined by
the above formula or categorical imperative alone, come from a variety
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of camps. However, I think all of these critics would agree in some
way with the following statement by W. K. Frankena:
There is more to the moral point of view than being willing
o universalize one's rules; Kant and his followers fail to
see this fact, although they are right in thinking such a will-ingness is part of it/^
Many existential thinkers have come down hard on Kant because they
find him neglecting the importance of the uniqueness of situations-a
uniqueness which Kant's formula appears to dilute and abstract. George
Schrader in his article "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral Imperatives"
criticizes this Kantian position from what he takes to be a Kirkegaardian
point of view. According to Schrader, Kant is correct in thinking that
moral rules formulated a priori by reason are needed in prescribing
duties. Nevertheless, the determination of our duties, especially
towards others, does not derive from one's pure reason, being thereby
autonomously grounded, but rather from the concrete reality of the
other person, being thereby heteronomously grounded. As Schrader
says:
To see the force of this objection, which has been voiced in
one way or another by a good many critics of Kant, we need
only to consider that our duties to another person presuppose
his existence. If there were no other persons, we would
have no social obligations. It is, thus, the sheer fact of
the other's existence in all its concreteness that consti-
tutes the initial ground of our obligation to him His
claim upon us derives from his totality as a person con-
fronting us in our world..
. . Moral duties to others not only
can but must have a heteronomous foundation.
I would like to take issue with the critics of Kant's formalism
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and specifically with Schrader's interpretation. To tip my hand just a
bit, I suspect that Schrader does not fully understand the meaning of
Kant's autonomy-heteronomy distinction, especially when he makes
statements like the following: "Moral responsibility even toward one-
self is not, then, exclusively a matter of autonomy— if the latter be
construed as giving universal meaning and significance to one's empir-
ical nature. But first I shall present another criticism against
Kant's formalism which I find closely related to Schrader's and which
I think has been adequately rebutted by R. M. Hare—a rebuttal which
I shall present later.
E. A. Gellner in his article "Ethics and Logic"74 argues against
what he takes to be R. M. Hare's Kantianism by saying that the pure
form of universality alone is not a sufficient condition for determining
our duties. Reference must be made to material considerations and,
therefore, the agent acts at least partly from inclination. A moral
valuation based on such considerations is what Gellner calls an E-type
maxim which has an ineliminable empirical element such that any
attempt to universalize it would make the reason for choosing the maxim
irrelevant. Unlike Gellner's U-type maxim, it is incapable of univer-
salization, that is:
its maxim cannot be deduced (in the sense in which an
exemplification is deduced from the rule it exemplifies)
from an open rule formulated with the help of only property
words and variables, but, of course, no proper names.
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An E-type maxim "corresponds to our notion of the real romantic
lover or the convinced believer, neither of whom can abandon the
conviction of the unique, appropriateness of the obje- 1 of his par-
ticular attitude. "76 Quixote's Intention to free Lady Dulcinea is no
doubt a good example of Gellner's E-type maxim.
Ultimately, in both a logical and a factual sense, choices
and decisions are made by concrete, here-now people and
no y principles.
. . . The factual sense amounts to this-
that even if the formal principles were strong enough to
'
entail valuations, these would nevertheless only in fact
e made thanks to and in the concrete existenz of indi-
vidual men, choosing or preferring to adopt them.^^
Such arguments against Kant's formalism are not new as one can
clearly see by noting such critics as Trendelenburg, Slmmel, Blanshard,
and Lotze. But perhaps the most influential critic has been Sir David
Ross in his commentary on the Foundations
. There he argues that
"Kant must be wrong ... in saying that we must act from a principle,
and not from a purpose. "78 According to Ross, Kant defines a moral
action, one done from duty, as having no purpose; whereas, on the
contrary, "It can be maintained that it is possible to have a direct incli-
nation to do a certain act and yet do it purely from a sense of duty.
These criticisms of Kant are based upon a complete misunderstand-
ing of the application of the formula of the categorical imperative to
specific moral intentions. Beck reminds us that when Kant speaks of
the content of a maxim being determined by its form.
What he is establishing
. . . is a principle of categorical
imperatives, a formula, a second-order principle, and not an
imperative for a specific action. The content of the maxim
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which is derived from its form is the maxim to act only onmaxims that fit the formula. 80
The content of first-order maxims depends upon empirical considera-
tions
. However, this specific intention is categorically reasonahlp
only if itMis under the second-order maxim, and a moral agent acts
— if he chooses this specific maxim with its specific
content because it falls under the second-order maxim. This is what
Kant means by the moral agent acting from a principle, which does not
imply that the action has no purpose.
In his article Sir David Ross on Duty and Purpose in Kant, " Beck
directly attacks Ross' interpretation: "Every action, properly so called,
is guided by a maxim A maxim is a rule to do certain things in
certain circumstances. These circumstances always have a bearing on
the attainment of some purpose; otherwise there is no occasion for act-
81ing at all. " The unique point Kant is trying to make is that if the
agent acts morally
,
then the material maxim which incorporates some
purpose must be chosen by the agent because it fits under a second-
order maxim whose content is determined by its form alone—a second-
order maxim that the agent has chosen to guide the choice of his speci-
fic intentions
.
Beck, therefore, seems correct in saying
There are thus two maxims even in moral action: (a) the
maxim of an action as a means to certain consequences--
this expresses the intention of the act and depends upon
specific conditions known only through experience; and
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(b) the maxim that any maxim of type (a) should also be
is dut7 82 condition of (b) over (a)
With this in mind we must agree with Paton that it is hard to see why
Kant "should be charged with forgetting that moral action has a matter
as well as a form, an empirical as well as an a priori element and an
object as well as a supreme principle. Kant does not forget. He
expects his readers to remember. "88 it clear, 1 think, from the
moral examples given in the Foundations that only by understanding the
empirical content of one's maxim can one decide whether it is worthy
of being considered a practical law.
In defending Kant against the charge of disjoining duty and pur
pose, a final point should be made. One must be careful not to con-
fuse acting from inclination with acting with a purpose. Quixote
acts with an end in view of righting a wrong, for example, the enchant-
ment of his Lady, but this does not necessarily mean that he acts out
of inclination. Rather, it may be that he takes this purpose to be his
duty; this end may be sought by Quixote because of its categorical
validity. When Ross criticizes Kant for inconsistently speaking of
purposes when developing his theory of "imperfect duties,"®"^ he for-
gets that "There are thus ends that are also duties.
In a reply to Gellner's article. Hare notes similar points of faulty
interpretation:
in his criticism of 'Kantianism,' Gellner seems to me to fail
to observe the distinction between these two kinds of rule.
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'"couiri
‘° '"° valuation
. . uld fit the rigour of pure formality (be completely of
Hare goes on to make the important distinction between second-order
and first-order principles:
The second-order principle analyzes the concept 'rational
principle' (in that sense of the expression in which it meansU type maxim') .... A person who accepts this second-
order principle has not thereby had all his moral problems
solved for him; he has to do something further in order to
obtain his first-order maxims, namely, exercise his autono-
mous, rational will by 'making laws for himself which are
of the form prescribed by the second-order principle, but are
not themselves formal. In simpler language, the first-order
principles are not deduced from the second
-order principle;
they are framed in accordance with it.^^
Schrader, I think, falls subject to this same confusion of moral
imperatives. An autonomously grounded second-order rational prin-
ciple does not mean that we do not have to take into account the con-
crete existence of persons in order to formulate first-order maxims
which accord with the second-order principle. In defense of his point,
however, Schrader adds that Kant himself qualifies his theory of
autonomy in holding that we should treat others as ends-in-themselves
,
and this, in the final analysis, depends upon the fact that they demand
respect qua actual subjects. Therefore, the very formulation of the
categorical imperative is heteronomously grounded . This, however,
is not a qualification; it is a substantiation of his theory. The treating
of other persons as ends-in-themselves is an objective end prescribed
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by reason itself, not a subjective end. This is so because this end of
moral action is also the around of moral law; the categorical impera-
tive would not exist if it were not for the existence of rational agents.
As Paton puts it, man is such a ground "because the categorical
imperative has its origin in his rational will" and therefore, "his
rational will ought not to be subordinated to any meaner end but is
89itself an end. Thus, to treat rational agents as ends-in-themselves
IS to act out of desire to obey the moral law, that is, to act autono-
mously, and, hence, can serve as a restatement of the formula of the
categorical imperative
. The following statement from "Duties
Towards Others" in Kant's Lectures on Ethics serves as an excellent
reply to Schrader:
Respect for the rights of others is rooted in principle, and as
mankind is not rich in principles. Providence has implanted
in our bosoms the instinct of benevolence to be the source of
actions by which we restore what we have unrightously pro-
cured
.
If this clarification of Kant's formalism is sound, we should have
then at least a hint toward solving the problem of harmonizing the
teleological and deontological themes of his ethics. As Sellars says,
"when Kant speaks ... of the happiness of others as a categorical
end, what he says is in no way inconsistent with his claim that the
ought of moral principles is categorical rather than the hypothetical
ought which pertains to the relation of means to ends."^^ Also,
Sellars continues, "when Kant stresses intentions, he is not
93
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disregarding consequences. Kant is simply saying that to locate the
rationality of action with respect to a moral agent, we must look to the
formal dimension of thought which is self-legislating. The moral
agent acts rationally only if his intention is categorically valid, that
IS, only if his intention is chosen because it conforms to the moral
law legislated by pure reason. We can always err in our judgment of
this data. But to err in this way does not explain the fallability of
moral judgment; for this one must first explain the possibility of a
categorically necessary Intention which is grounded In the concept of
a pure practical reason. Sellars, in the following statement, neatly
sums up this Kantian moral position:
Kant is insisting that the principles in terms of which the con
cept of a categorically valid intention is to be explicated are
not empirical principles. They are a priori
. and can, in
principle, be known by a 'mere analysis of the conceptions
of morality. The fallibility of moral philosophy is not the
fallibility of empirical induction.
However, this development of the categorical validity of intentions
does not completely establish that the moral imperative is any more
than merely logically possible. This principle of autonomy asserts
how a moral agent would necessarily act if he were completely rational
and how he ought to act if he were irrational enough to be inclined
otherwise. This involves a use of pure practical reason which has as
its central concept freedom of the will. Therefore, only by showing
the objective reality of freedom can Kant make good his claim for a
rationality of action as it relates to the meaning of a moral personality.
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This rationality of action that Kant is seeking revolves around the
question of how 2ure reason can be practical. And such a question
concerns not only the loaic of practical reasoning, which deals with
the purely formal structure of thought, but also the metaphysics of
practical reasoning, which deals with the determination of objects. 9=
The former concerns the categorical validity of practical laws, while
the latter concerns their causal efficacy within the concrete world.
In both the idea of a free is immanent. In fact, it might be said
that what Kant is doing in the second Critique is giving the proper
relationship between the logical and metaphysical foundations of a
practical law, because only then can we truly explain what it means to
be free.
CHAPTER II
AN INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S THEORY OF MORAL WILLING
(4) The Distinction between Wille and Willkilr
When we developed Kant's theory of desire as it relates to rational
action, we were at the same time providing a background for an analysis
of his theory of will, m fact, Kant, in several passages, identifies it
with the faculty of desire.^ The most important of these passages
occurs in the Metaphysics of MoraLs -
The faculty of desiring in accordance with concepts is called
the faculty of doing or forebearing as one likes insofar as theground determining it to action is found in the faculty of
desire itself and not in the object. Insofar as it is combined
with the consciousness of the capacity of its action to pro-duce its object it is called or Choice /Willkiir 7.
The faculty of desire whose internal ground of determination
and, consequently, even whose likings are found in the
reason of the subject is called the will /“ier Wille 7.^
I shall explore the distinction and interrelation between the faculties
of Mile and WHikDr found in Kant’s theory of will. Later I shall show
the relationship of these concepts to the concept of Gesinnunq which
serves to unify the many discreet acts of willing, thereby establishing
a moral personality.
In his article "Kant's Two Conceptions of the Will in Their Politi-
cal Context ' and also in his Commentary
. Beck argues that these two
Ill
different conceptions of the will are carried over into the second
Crltlciue from two preceding works . 3 the Critique of Pnre
Kant introduces the concept of freedom as spontaneity such that a free
will has the power of initiating a new causal series in time. As 1
tried to develop in the first chapter, this is freedom as a pure tran-
scendental idea
.
In the Foundation s Kant develops the concept of freedom around
the idea of autonomx such that a will which possesses this property
is lawgiving, "the property which the will has of being a law to itself. "5
According to Beck, the former conception of will is that of Wlllkur while
the latter is that of WUe- Thus he speaks of a "free, i.e. autono-
mous Wille " determining a "free, i.e. spontaneous, Willkiir
. Along
with Sllber I find this interpretation of Beck's unsatisfactory.^
the Metaphysics of Morals Kant says:
The Will, which relates to nothing but the law, cannot be
called either free or unfree, for it relates not to action, butimmediately to legislation for the maxims of action
Only will can, therefore, be called free.^
In light of this passage it is wrong to call Wille either autonomous or
heteronomous because these are predicates that relate the will to action.
It is better to call Willkiir either autonomous or heteronomous depend-
ing on whether or not it chooses to act in accordance with the law Wille
prescribes. Therefore, it is even misleading to speak of Wijj^ deter-
mining Willkiir, since this seems to negate Willkur's freedom of
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self-determination. Silber correctly explains Mile to be free
-only
in the sense that reason, as judgment and imagination, is free: it
has spontaneity. -9 is the pure practical aspect of reason.
It must be granted that in many places Kant seems to associate
the concept of autonomy with Wille and heteronomy with Willkur r^Q
however, as Beck himself admits, not until the Metaphysics of Mnr.ic
does Kant reach full clarity concerning the distinction between these
two faculties of will.^^ And even then we must try to understand what
Kant should have said in light of his whole theory of volition and
freedom, rather than what he in fact does say in particular instances.
This, I think, is Silber 's great merit as a Kant scholar.
Furthermore, we must continually keep in mind in our develop-
ment of Wille and Willkur that they are abstracted functions of a
unitary concept of will, just as sensibility, imagination, and understand-
ing are abstractions derived from an analysis of empirical thought in the
Critique
. Therefore, Beck should not find it so surprising that,
oven in the Metaphysics of Morals
, "he does not often succeed in
keeping discussion of one of them from interrupting discussion of the
other.
^
In his Commentary Beck says that Willkur may or may not be
free depending upon whether it chooses its maxims because of their
13iawlikeness. Willkur fails to exercise its freedom when "it gives
way to the importunities of sense and is a will in name only, really
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being an aLbitrium brutum
.
"14
i this interpretation confusing, if
not entirely wrong, especially in light of what Kant says in the first
Critique :
The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensitivnm not
ate Its action. There is in man a power of self-determinationindependently of any coercion through sensuous impulses. 15
Simply because we might say someone is acting li^ an animal
does not mean that he is not acting freely and, therefore, not respon-
sible for his actions. Rather, we mean he is acting irrationally: the
practical principles he gooses to act upon are not laws prescribed by
Mile. It is permitting oneself to be overwhelmed by what one is
when one fails in the task of continuously realizing one's essential
rationality. In this case Willkilr is acting heternomously but neverthe-
less freely. Even Beck admits that no matter how "depraved Willkilr
may be, it still hears the 'heavenly voice' of pure practical reason, so
that even the most hardened criminal trembles before its tribunal.
But what Beck fails to realize is that the hearing of this "voice" alone
is sufficient to constitute Wiilkur's freedom.^ ^
In speaking of man acting irrationally in the above sense, I am
not overlooking the fact that Kant makes room for reason in the service
of motives which pure reason does not legislate. This much we learned
from the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.
However, I think the use of such a concept is legitimized by Kant's
defining Wille as "a kind of causality belonging to living beings so
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far as they are rational. "1 8 Therefore, not to act according to the pre-
scriptions of is in a very Important sense to act irrationally.
It is important to distinguish for Kant a rational action, conceived as
an autonomous action, from that sense of rationality used by Kant in
a generic way. To fail to grasp this distinction is to miss Kant's full
picture of the rationality of action. In the Foundations Kant recognizes
the above distinction within the will of a rational being:
That IS to say, the relation of objective laws to a will notgood through and through is conceived as one in which theWill of a rational being, although it is determined by prin-
ciples of reason, does not necessarily follow these princi-pi6S in virtuG of its own nature.^
^
It IS essential for Kant's theory of freedom that it include this
sense of the irrational which is to be understood as a mode of rationa-
lity in the broad sense. Beck seems to narrow Kant's theory of freedom
to man in his autonomy which is to make nonsense out of moral blame-
worthiness. As Baton says, to understand Kant's theory of freedom
we must grasp the sense in which "we must freely allow ourselves to
be influenced by heteronomous laws."^° To argue, as Beck does,
that Willklir is free only if it follows laws of reason is to fail to dis-
tinguish the human will from a holy will,^^ thereby making the experi-
ence of obligation meaningless. To say that Willkur did not act in
eccordance with laws prescribed by Wille and is, therefore, morally
blameworthy is meaningful only if Willkur freely chose to disobey
the laws of its rational nature, the laws of freedom. In fact, when
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developing Kant's theory of moral evil. Beck himself recognizes that
miikur does not loose its freedom in disobeying Wille
. Beck says at
this point that "the subjective ground of decision (of Willkuri
.
. . must
itself be an act of freedom" and "evil lies, therefore, not in a failure
under the conditions of nature to exercise freedom but in a maxim that
IS freely adopted and is in opposition to the maxim.
. . of the pure
practical reason.
In "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion " Silber holds
that, in the Foundations
,
Kant's views of freedom and the will are far
too fragmentary to see heteronomy as a mode of freedom. Not until the
second Critique does Kant begin to develop the sensuous nature of man
in relation to his freedom. Kant's advance in the second Critique may
be seen in his recognition that the will which is categorically obli-
gated is not the will of a rational being as such but of a rational and a
sensible being--a human being torn between the demands of his sensi-
r\ A
ble and rational natures
. But by making room for a free heteronomous
willing, and thereby moral evil, Kant must face the fact that a moral
agent can still be free, and hence a person, even in rejecting the moral
law. How then can this law be a necessary condition for a moral per-
sonality? How is the categorical validity of intentions connected to
a free will? Because of Kant's uncertainty in handling this problem,
he occasionally in the Critique of Practical Reason reverts to defining
25freedom as obedience to the moral law. Kant's insights in the
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second Crmaue concerning the essential connection between freedom
and the moral law are not fully born out until he systematizes the
dynamics of the will through his Wllle -Wlllkur distinction.
(5) Relations between Transcendental and Practical Freedom
The relationship between responsibility and freedom demands for
Kant a careful distinction between empirical and psychological freedom
and transcendental freedom. To be morally responsible is to be self-
determined, which implies freedom from external influences. Recog-
nizing this many empiricists try to account for a free will by relating
it to actions issuing from "ideas we have produced by our own powers.
However, although
these conceptions do indeed imply psychological freedom (if
one wishes to use this word for a merely internal concatena-
tion of ideas of the mind),
. . . nevertheless they also imply
natural necessity, leaving no room for transcendental free-dom, which must be thought of as independent from every-
thing empirical and hence from nature generally.
. . . With-
out transcendental freedom, which is its proper meaning,
and which is alone a priori practical, no moral law and no
accountability to it are possible.
In the first Critique Kant says that freedom in its practical sense,
that is, 'WHlklir's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses,"
is based upon this pure transcendental idea of freedom.^® This practi-
cal freedom
presupposes that although something has not happened, it
ought to have happened, and that its cause, ^as found_7
in the /"field of_7 appearance, is not, therefore, so
determining that it excludes a causality of our will - a
causality which, independently of these natural causes.
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and even contrary to their forces and Influence, can producesomething that is determined In the time-order In accordance
with empirical laws, and which can therefore begin a series
of events endrely of itself .
This concept of ought cannot be accounted for through empirical or
psychological freedom where the subject is impelled by ideas, an
automaton splrituale a la Leibniz. Freedom in this sense is "no
better than the freedom of a turnspit, which when once would up also
carries out its motions of itself.
Many interpreters of Kant, for example, the early Moore,
regard the following passage of the Canon of the first Critique as
being inconsistent with the above position, because it appears to
claim the independence of practical and transcendental freedom, there-
by, cancelling the former's grounding in the latter: "The question of
transcendental freedom is a matter for speculative knowledge only, and
when we are dealing with the practical, we can leave it aside as being
an issue with which we have no concern.
But as Beck points out, we must interpret this in the context of
what Kant intended to do in the Canon. A canon is "the sum total of
the a priori principles of the correct employment of certain faculties
of knowledge, " and when in the practical sphere we deal with laws
of conduct, we are not dealing with the problem of whether causality
through freedom is compatible with natural necessity. This does not
mean that practical freedom is independent of transcendental freedom,
but rather that different questions are asked concerning the justification
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of each. In fact, the question of their independence ought not to arise
at all since Kant is saying that they are really two different ways of
talking about the same freedom.
By saying that it is a practical purpose, rather than a theoretical
one, which makes us apply the categories beyond experience
, in
this case the category of causality through freedom, it has often been
thought that Kant completely separates these realms. This is not the
case, however, for Kant also points out that "it is one and the same
reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or
for practical purposes. Pure theoretical and pure practical reason
are not two different faculties, but one faculty with different interests.
In Part I I tried to show that reason has different interests and the
power to pursue them. There is, however, essential interrelation and
unity among these many interests, including practical and transcenden-
tal freedom a fact which will become even clearer when we come to
Kant's transcendental deduction of freedom.
An exploration of the concept of freedom is the best way, I think,
to bring this unity of reason to the surface, because "it is, properly
speaking, only the concept of freedom among all the ideas of pure
speculative reason, which brings /”knowledgeJ7 such a great extension
in the supersensuous
. The concept of freedom is important both
to the theoretical and practical purposes of reason, and its category,
namely causality, is an extension of that same category of mind whose
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objective reality tvith respect to objects of experience v,as proved in
the first Crltiaue.^5 Furthermore, to justify freedom in its practical
use is to give reality to that which for theoretical reason is purely
problematic, and by so doing, "the practical use of reason is thus
connected with the elements of theoretical reason.
The following passage of the second Critique carries through the
spirit of the Canon:
The decision as to whether the causality of the will is sufficient
to the reality of the objects is left up to the theoretical princi-
ples of reason, involving as it does an investigation of the
possibility of objects of volition, the intuition of which is
of no importance in the practical problem. The only concern
here is with the determination of the will and with the deter-
mining ground of its maxims as a free will, not with its
results
.
With what was said above, it should now be clear that this in
no way conflicts with Kant’s claim that practical freedom is grounded
upon transcendental freedom or with his saying that "With the pure
practical faculty of reason, the reality of transcendental freedom is also
confirmed. ' Reason has different purposes when employed theoreti-
cally and practically, which in no way implies that the will's spontan-
eous causal efficacy and its legislation of moral laws are independent
of each other.
Silber notes that empirical freedom is actually a kind of self-
predetermination and, although freedom and determinism are compatible
according to Kant, freedom and predeterminism never are. As Kant
says in the Religion :
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what we wish to understand, and never shall understand is
(wni^^ 'r to which voluntary° tictions, as events, have their determiningSrounds in_antecedent time
.
.
. , can be consistent withedom according to which the act as well as its oppo-
of itsTaklng
The transcendentally free agent is able to formulate his Intentions with
out being determined by his inclinations or his own inner character,
and this holds true even if his Willktir chooses against his Wille
.
Transcendental freedom is expressed through the heteronomy, as well
as the autonomy of WUkUr, otherwise the idea that he ought to have
done otherwise, which is the key concept of practical freedom, is
meaningless
.
But, heteronomous willing is not a positive realization of tran-
scendental freedom. Silber says in "The Ethical Significance" that
the individual in adopting a heteronomous maxim freely
renounces his power as a free being to act independently
of desires. He freely chooses to act iust the way he would
act if he had no such freedom at all."^^
This seemingly paradoxical statement embodies, I think, a fundamental
insight into Kant's theory of freedom—an insight which I find appro-
priate to look into at this time because of its relevance to the distinc-
tion and relations between transcendental and practical freedom.
In the Cntique of Pure Reason Kant establishes that transcenden-
tal freedom is at least not incompatible with nature and that this
freedom should not "be conceived only negatively as Independence of
empirical conditions but also positively "as the power of originating
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a series of events. " But, in his Commentary
. Beck mistakenly
ascribes negative freedom to this latter concept of causa noumpnnn
Rather, what Beck should have said is that Kanfs positive concept of
transcendental freedom is left empty in the first Critique because it was
provided With no law. The purpose of the Foundations and the Critique
oLPracticanteas^ is to provide such a law, thereby explaining what
Kant means in the first Crltlaue by saying that "reason sets bounds to
a freedom which is in itself without law.
This law is the moral law which is legislated by Wille and exe-
cuted by Wimir. WUe is that purely rational faculty of will which
introduces the concept of practical freedom and gives positive content
to transcendental freedom. Perhaps what Beck means is that from a
practical point of view, transcendental freedom of the first Critique is
negative. This Kant would agree with. Silber, therefore, is not
equivocating on the concept of freedom in the above passage. He is
speaking of two different aspects of freedom which are essentially
joined and explained through the Wille -Wilikur distinction. To make a
variation on Kant's aphorism, Wille without Willkhr is impotent; Willkur
without Wille is blind.
In a heternomous moral willing Willkur disobeys the law of its
very nature and, thereby, fails to be true to itself. Yet, because it is
sustained by the moral law, it is always free in its execution. Silber
does not mean that a rational being can freely choose not to be free,
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for this is impossible. By the very fact that he is a rational being, the
commands of Wille are ever-present, making freedom not oniy man's
greatest gift, but also his greatest burden. Man cannot escape his
freedom
.
However, man can freely choose not to fully realize his powers
of freedom by trying to escape the law of his freedom, just as he can
fail to fully actualize his powers of rationality by acting irrationally.
Nevertheless, only a rational being can be regarded as acting irration-
ally, as opposed to nonrationally
. Man can no more escape the law of
his freedom than he can escape his essential rationality by acting
irrationally. Both heteronomous actions and irrational uses of mind
are judged according to laws of freedom and reason. And because free-
don is an expression of rationality for Kant, as it was for Plato,
— heteronomy and the mind's irrationality is more than an analogy,
What we have said seems to be perfectly in line with what Kant
says in the third .Critique: "For where the moral law dictates there is,
objectively, no room left for free choice ^Wahl 7 as to what one has
to do. From a practical point of view, Willkur operates in light of
a law and, hence, can neither be indifferent in its choice nor simply
choose to do what it wants. Willkur is truly free only if it executes
its obligations necessitated by Wille
. Here we are reminded of
Spinoza's and Leibniz's connection between freedom and rational neces-
sity--namely
,
that one is free only when one is truly rational.
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irrationality being the mark of servitude. But Kant's advance beyond
the rationalists is his accounting for guilt and culpable irrationality
by Viewing them as negative expressions of man's basic freedom and
rationality. Furthermore, obligation is for Kant a practical not a
theoretical necessity. As Silber says:
Obligation enters as a relation between the subject and the
h whenubject he is tempted to disobey. A transcendentally freeuman being, if tempted to abnegate his freedom in the expres-
sion of It, IS categorically obligated to actualize his free
nature.
... He has the freedom to reject the law but he
cannot escape its condemnation and its punishment in thedestruction of his personality.^^
This practical necessity, therefore, in no way cancels out the
freedom of Vnilkur
. Willkur can be rationally determined by Wille
without losing its freedom, because we are dealing with the same con
cept of will from which we have abstracted two different faculties.
Beck states this well when he says:
The law is found not by seeking something outside the Willkur
but by a regression upon the conditions of its full freed"orTH
conditions that are not actually realized in the matured man.
Thus, Kant explicitly says, we find Wille by a regression
upon the conditions of Willkur.
The Mlie-mUkur distinction exemplifies the interdependence between
transcendental and practical freedom in that the transcendental freedom
of Willkur is given positive content by the law-giving nature of Wille
,
pure practical reason positive content which the speculative concerns
of the first Critique by its very nature could not provide.
One cannot, however, understand Kant's discussion of the
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freedom of Willkur unless one realizes that two different senses of free-
dom are involved, milkur
,
as the faculty of free choice, is free even
when choosing heteronomously
. It is transcendentally free. But, this
is not enough to establish practical freedom. If one wants to act
morally, then one is not free to act independently of the moral law,
but must obey the commands of Wille
. Such a practical necessity does
not cancel out the free choice of Willkur because Willkiir has the power
to reject such commands. Also, because Wille is not a separate
"thing" from Willkur
,
but rather the purely rational aspect of Willkur
itself which allows it to be truly spontaneous and not determined by
things outside it, Willkur not only retains its free choice, but actually
gains a much deeper sense of freedom.
Because Kant finds the source of the moral law to be within the
concept of the rational will itself, rather than in experience, or God,
or rational perfection, obedience to it is not restrictive of freedom, but
rather a full expression of freedom. Through the discovery of the Wille -
Willkiir distinction Kant is able to preserve the formal purity of the
moral law while showing its necessary connection to free action.
(6) Kant's Analysis of Freely Choosing a Moral Personality
The Wille -Willkur distinction is carved by Kant from an analysis
of will only because of his insight into the essential relation between
freedom and reason, both of which are grounded in the concept of
spontaneity. Kant introduces this concept in the Critique of Pure
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Reason as "the mind's power of producing representations from itself, "53
which for theoretical reason is the faculty of understanding. This same
concept is also the key for practical reason and its faculty of will,
for in analyzing both knowledge and moral action we must deal with
thought that is unconditioned.
mile is pure spontaneity itself, whereas Beck seems to think that
spontaneity only applies to the actions of Willkiir .^^ As Kant says in
Postumum
, spontaneity can be predicated of Willkilr :
Freedom of choice (Willkilr ) in view of the choice /"Wahl7
of the lawful and the counter-lawful is merely relative
spontaneity and is jibertas phaenomenon
: /freedom of
choice in view of_7 the choice of maxims of actions is
absolute spontaneity and is libertas noumenon .^^
Comparative or empirical freedom and phenomenal freedom coincide;
both must agree with the laws of determinable phenomena. But Willkilr
is unconditionally spontaneous, that is, free from being conditioned by
inclination, precisely because it presupposes the pure spontaneity of
mile . Without the latter we could only speak of the will causing
something to happen in the world of appearances relative to some parti-
cular end or desire. This concerns the logical use of reason rather
than its real use by which reason legislates laws^^--a distinction
Kant realizes as early as the Inaugural Dissertation of 1 770.^^
This phenomenal and noumenal freedom of Willkur points to man
as both a natural and a moral being. The Willkur of man as a natural
being, having relative spontaneity, is the source of human actions
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seen as causally determined events; the WlllkiiV of man as a moral
being, having absolute spontaneity, is the source of the adoption of
intentions upon which the former action is based. The actions
performs in the phenomenal world are morally significant
because they are based upon the intentions chosen by this same Willkur
in the noumenal world. As Kant states this in the Religion
,
the
freedom of Willkur is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive
can determine the Willkur to an action only so far as the individual
incorporated it into his maxim
. . .; only thus can an incentive,
whatever it may be, co-exist with the absolute spontaneity of Willkur
(i.e. freedom).
Because Willkur is a faculty of desire, Wille
,
if it is to be effec-
tive, must be able to affect Willkur by arousing desires within it. That
which is aroused is called by Kant moral feeling (moralisches Gefuhl )
which is simply "respect for the moral law" and which is known a priori
because it is caused by reason. Willkur may fail to act out of
respect for the moral law and thereby fail to be true to its own rational
nature, but it is never totally devoid of moral feeling. Kant claims in
the Metaphysics of Morals that if one lost this feeling, he would at
6
1
the same time lose his claim to humanity. He would be morally dead.
In the Religion Kant says: "The incentive which consists in respect
for the moral law we have never been able to lose, and were such a
thing possible, we could never get it again. 62 It is in this sense
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that Silber argues, ’mUe necessarily determines Wlllkur
.
"S3
Herein
lies the origin of characteristics such as humility, guilt, and self-
respect
.
The relation this moral feeling has to Willkur is a key to Willkur's
relation to mile. The question that arises is, if the moral feeling
MI.ects Wlllkur by way of WiUe> how can acts done out of this feeling
be free? In answering this we must again remember that we are deal-
ing with abstracted faculties of a unitary concept of will which neces-
sarily leads to distortion. It is better to speak of moral feeling
arising out of the will as a whole, for it originates through the inter-
action of both Wille and Willkur
. Moral feeling is actualized by
Willkur only after it has freely chosen to obey the moral law, but such
a choice would be impossible if it were not for the ever-presence of
• Silber puts this quite nicely when he says: "When the
examination of Wille is extended, Wille is seen to be merely the
internal rational conditions of the existence of Willkur
. Hence, when
Kant says that Wille determines Willkur through moral feeling, he is
saying that Willklir determines itself according to its rational nature.
Once the moral feeling has been established as being present in
Willkur
,
Willkur
,
when viewed phenomenally, can be said to be deter-
mined by it. It is important to note the two senses of determination
at work here. From the point of view of freedom there is determination
by the spontaneity of pure reason itself, independent of any conditions.
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However, we can see WlMf from another point of view as conforming
to empirical iaws of the understanding thereby determined by prior
conditions. In the second Critique Kant says that "the moral law, as
a formal determining ground of action through practical pure reason.
. is also a subjective ground of determination. That is, it is the
incentive to this action, since it has an influence on the sensibility
of the subject and effects a feeling which promotes the influence of
the law on the will. But to ask what incentive causes Willkur to
have respect for the law is improper, because as Silber correctly
states:
In asking this guestion, we are looking for the antecedent
conditions from which Willkur's free acceptance of the law
must follow. But if such conditions could be found, then
Willkur would not be free, since freedom involves the
capacity to act independently of such conditions
.
With this we come to a point where freedom and the absolute
necessity of the laws of rational action meet and reason seeks condi-
tions through which it can gain insight into this meeting. But as Kant
makes clear in the Concluding Note to the Foundations
.
to seek con-
ditions for that which is unconditionally necessary is to postpone the
fulfillment of reason. "Hence reason unrestingly seeks the uncondi-
tionally necessary and sees itself compelled to assume this without
fi 7
any means of making it comprehensible.
. .
." Reason must be
content to comprehend the incomprehensibility of the nature of freedom
with its necessary law, for truly "This is all that can fairly be asked
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of a philosophy which presses forward in Its principles to the very limit
68
of human reason. "
decision to obey or not to obey the law of its rational
nature forms the disposition of the will or Gesinnuna
. This concept
is defined in the Religion as "the ultimate subjective ground of the
adoption of maxims. We might call it a second order intention
Which, after it is freely adopted by Willkur
. determines a person's
hfe-style as it is enacted through specific intentional acts. The choos-
ing of a moral disposition and the choosing to do specific acts are
separate but related acts of Willkur :
The term 'act' can apply in general to that exercise of freedom
whereby the supreme maxim (in harmony with the law or con-
trary to it) is adopted by the Willkur /^the dispositional act_J^,
but also to the exercise of freedom whereby the actions them-
selves (considered materially, i.e. with reference to the
objects of Willkur ) are performed in accordance with that
maxim /"the specific acts_/.^^
Green and Hudson translate " aufnehmen " and " annehmen . " verbs
Kant uses to describe the relation of Willkur to Gesinnunq .^^ as
"adopt", and Silber in his introduction to the Religion goes along with
this. However, without a careful explanation, it seems to me that
such a translation is very misleading. Not only does it sound odd to
speak of adopting or choosing a disposition, but it also sounds as if
Willkur reaches outside itself to choose something separate from it,
which would be absolutely counter-Kantian. To my mind a better render-
ing of Kant's meaning would be "to embrace" or "to establish" or
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perhaps "to make one's own, " because WlMr is simply choosing to
actualize or accentuate a particular attitude towards itself. That is,
it chooses to recognize itself in a certain way, a recognition which
establishes a particular moral disposition which was always potentially
present as a part of the very nature of Willkiir itself.
The concept of ^esinnunq is essential to Kant's theory of will,
for it gives unity to the moral personality allowing good and evil to be
predicated of it. But because it is the noumenal actuality of Willkur
.
it would have to be inferred from the phenomenal specific acts deter-
72
mined by it. As Kant says in the Religion :
In order to call a man evil, it would have to be possible a
infer from several acts done with a consciousness
of their evil, or from one such act, as underlying evil
maxim, and further, from this maxim to infer the presence
in the agent of an underlying common ground, itself a
maxim, of ail particular morally—evil maxims. ^
Hence, although the will is either good or evil, depending upon
Willkur's relation to Wille
, which in turn determines the Gesinnung
.
man is unable to know this on the level of mere observation because
of the inevitable distortion of the dispositional intention by the speci-
fic concrete acts
. Not only can the moral agent make mistakes in
judgment in trying to serve the moral law, but also empirical observa-
tions of an agent s acts can only lead to knowledge of virtus phaenomenon
and legality, not to virtus noumenon and morality.
Gesinnung is the core of the personality, being the enduring
aspect of Willkur
. It serves to relate the many discrete acts of
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MU^r providing what Silber calis "continuity essential to moral self-
identity. But the concept of Gesinnung would be contrary to our
moral experience and inconsistent with the spontaneity of Wlllkur if
MUkur were unable to change, its disposition. The freedom of Willkur
demands that it never be predetermined by what it was the moment
before. This is another statement of the burden of freedom; the preser-
vation of one's moral character is a continual task and awesome respon
siblllty. Furthermore, as long as Wlllkur can hear the voice of wille
.
as long as it is responsive to its own rationality, one "can become a
new man" "through a revolution in the man's disposition (a going
over to the maxim of holiness of the disposition).
For man, therefore, who despite a corrupted heart yet pos-
sesses a good will /"Wille 7 , there remains hope of a return
to the good from which he has strayed.
Through the concept of freedom in its relation to action, Kant is
defining what it means to be a moral person. The mark of moral per-
sonality, according to Kant, is to be responsible for one's actions
judged according to self-legislated laws.^® Our experience of obliga-
tion is the awareness of personality itself. In Silber's words:
The moral law, according to Kant, reveals the fact and the
meaning of human personality. By telling us what we
Q^ght to do regardless of what our inclinations and desires
may bid us do, the moral law forces us to be aware of
ourselves as agents, rather than as mere creatures of desire.
To recognize our freedom is not only to recognize our essential rationa-
lity, but also to count ourselves as a part of humanity. Correspondingly
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to fail to realize our full potential for freedom is to lose some of our
right to be a part of this humanity.
In sections (4)-(6) I have tried to provide an analysis of Kant's
theory of will by focusing upon his Wille -Willkur distinction. Such
an analysis is important in understanding the causal efficacy of pure
practical reasoning, that is, how it is determinative of concrete action.
This goes beyond what was said in sections (l)-(3) where I tried to
uncover the essential machinery involved in Kant's rationality of
action, machinery which included the principle of autonomy pointing to
a purely formal and normative dimension of thought. Kant's theory of
will actually puts this machinery to work.
In my analysis of Wille -Willkur I have agreed with Silber
sgainst Beck in making room for free heteronomous actions without which
there would be no meaning to moral blameworthiness. To say that one
acts freely only when one's actions are morally praiseworthy is to make
a mockery of freedom and to overlook the full picture of Willkur
. How-
ever, Beck is certainly right in seeing that without Wille there would be
no freedom at all, since Willkur would then have no other laws to choose
to operate under except heteronomous ones. That is, Willkur would
have no rational autonomy to actualize. Wille is free in the same sense
that Leibniz's ultimate monad is free; it is conditioned by nothing but
its own pure rational spontaneity. The laws that Wille prescribes are
prescribed necessarily since to prescribe anything else would be to
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make it something less than Wllle
.
pure practical reason. Its freedom
consists in its own purity.
In section (5) I specifically discussed the distinction and inter-
relation between the transcendental and practical aspects of freedom,
although in fact, when discussing Wille -Willkilr
.
we are necessarily
referring to and interweaving both of these points of view. The tran-
scendental idea of freedom independent of practical freedom is purely
problematic and, in a very real sense, negative since it is lawless.
Practical freedom, on the other hand, without being grounded upon the
transcendental idea of freedom has no way of being causally effica-
tious. In effect, without a solution to the Third Antinomy the second
Critique could never have been written, unless of course Kant simply
wanted to recognize an awareness of a purely formal 'ought' which
could never be objectively justified through action. Moreover the
first Critique's justification of the legitimacy of causality through
freedom, stronger yet, its demonstration of the very need for the idea
of freedom to give unity to the understanding's investigations of nature,
plays an essential role in the actual deduction of practical freedom in
the second Critique
. An investigation of this deduction will serve as
the focus of my final chapter.
Finally, in section (6) I tried to get an even deeper insight into
the Wille-Willkur distinction and the relation between these two facul-
ties by focusing upon the very complex activities and unity of Willkur
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as it struggles under both natural and moral demands and as it is seen
as the bearer of both phenomenal and noumenal freedom. In so doing
I specifically dealt with Kant's important concepts " moralisches
GefuJli" and "Gesinnung", the former concerning how Willkiir springs
into action and the latter concerning its identity as a moral persona-
lity. However, necessary to the understanding of both of these con-
cepts is the fact that spontaneity must be predicated of both Wille and
Willkiir
. Room must be made for both the freedom of legislation and
the freedom of choosing, each being different functions within a unitary
theory of will.
CHAPTER III
KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE MORAL LAW:
A LAW FOR THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF FREEDOM
(7) The Development of Kant's Deduction and a
Clarification of Its Apparent Circularity
In Kant's development of the second Critique I think one can find
an analogue to the metaphysical and transcendental deductions of the
Critique of Pure Reason
. The metaphysical deduction of the first
Critique has the task of exposing the essential categories of empirical
knowledge which, in effect, is what we were trying to do in sections
(l)-(3) for rational action. There are, of course, no exact parallels
between the metaphysical deductions of the two Critiques since, as
Beck puts it, "there is no ready-made table of formal distinctions to
serve as a clue to the discovery of the principle of pure practical reason.
Nevertheless, in both deductions the following very general procedure
is employed:
We can come to know pure practical laws in the same way we
know pure theoretical principles, by attending to the neces-
sity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the
elimination from them of all empirical conditions, which reason
directs
.
^
In sections (l)-(3) we attempted to attend to just such a necessity and
to carry out just such an elimination, arriving, in the final analysis,
at the formal and unconditioned origin of the moral law itself.
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However, just as In the first Critique
,
Kant in the Critique of
Practical Reason realizes the need for a transcendental deduction of
the principles of pure practical reason. Thus far our analysis of free-
dom and action has been mainly problematical in asking thes e questions:
If pure reason is practical, then what must be its principles (Chap-
ter I) and what must be the nature of the will that can enact these
principles (Chapter II)? If the concept of obligation is not spurious
and if morality is to be a meaningful dimension of human experience,
then what is the moral law and the nature of the will which actualizes
it? In answering these questions, however, we have yet to prove the
objective reality of the moral law. Just as in the first Critique the
transcendental deduction is charged with showing that the categories
have a^riori employment as conditions for knowledge of an object, so
too the transcendental deduction of the second Critique has the task of
showing that pure reason is a priori practical. This, at the same time,
as we shall see, shows the objective reality of freedom.
From the Critique of Pure Reason we are familiar with how a
transcendental deduction proceeds. It is concerned more with a ques-
tion of right than with a question of fact.^ Given the fact that men
use the concept of cause and that they believe themselves duty-bound,
still there is a question concerning the justification of the use of these
concepts. The general program of the transcendental deduction of the
first Critique may be summarized as follows: Any formal element X
without which experience of empirical objects would be impossible is
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necessary and hence objectively valid for such experience. That is,
one takes some body of knowledge (in the above case science, but
remember Kant also provides a transcendental deduction for the forms
of intuition by way of mathematics) and then through a critical regres-
sion upon its presuppositions proceeds to uncover the concepts and
principles which are necessary for it.
Although we might expect Kant to proceed in the same way in
deducing the principle of pure practical reason, we shall find some-
thing quite different happening. In fact, it really is an equivocation
to keep the word "deduction" unless it is clearly distinguished from
that of the first Critique
. Kant himself emphatically states that "the
objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction.
It is not difficult to understand why Kant wants to insist upon the dis-
tinction between the "deductions" of the two Critiques
, even though he
feels it appropriate to use the word in justifying the moral law:
with the deduction, i.e. the justification of the moral law's
objective and universal validity and the discernment of
the possibility of such a synthetic a priori proposition, one
cannot hope to have everything as easy as it was with the
principles of pure theoretical understanding. For the latter
referred to objects of possible experience, i.e., appear-
ances, and it could be proved that they could be known as
objects of experience and, consequently, that all possible
experience must be conformable to these laws ....
Such a procedure, however, I cannot follow in the deduc-
tion of the moral law. For it does not concern knowledge
of the properties of objects, which may be given to reason
from some other source; rather it concerns knowledge inso-
far as it can itself become the ground of the existence of
objects, and in so far as reason by virtue of this same
knowledge, has causality in a rational being.
^
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If Kant's deduction in the second Critique paralleled that of the
first, then we should expect him to introduce a notion of "moral
experience, " the critical regression from which would lead to princi-
ples without which such experience would be unintelligible. In the
Canon Kant seems to come close to such a procedure in saying: "I am
justified in making this assumption /'namely, that pure moral laws are
a prion practicat7 in that I can appeal ... to the moral judgment of
every man, in so far as he makes the effort to think such a law clearly.
But in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant introduces what seems to
be a completely different procedure when he says that
. . . .the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact
,
as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori
conscious, even if it be granted that no exarrmle could be
found in which it has been followed exactly.^
And again:
The consciousness of this fundamental law may be called
a fact of reason
, since one cannot ferret it out from ante-
cedent data of reason, such as the consciousness of free-
dom (for this is not antecedently given)
,
and since it forces
itself upon us as a synthetic proposition a priori based on
no pure or empirical intuition it is.
.
. the sole fact of
pure reason
,
which by it proclaims itself as originating
law (sic volo
, sic inbeo) .
°
An analysis of this "fact of pure reason" and how it functions in
the deduction is, I think, the key to understanding Kant's "proof" of
pure reason's being practical and consequently of the objective reality
of freedom.
In the third chapter of the Foundations Kant attempts a deduction
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of the moral law which Paton interprets as an obvious failure. ^ That is
why, according to Paton, we see the deduction appearing with a new
face in the second Critique
. Paton states the difference as follows:
In the Groundwork he seems to think that the moral law is bothjustified and established by an independent and necessary
presupposition of freedom. In the Critique
. on the contrary
It IS our consciousness of the moral law which leads to the
'
concept of freedom; and in such consciousness Kant no longer
finds difficulty.
. . . Only on the basis of the moral law
can we justify the presupposition that the rational will must
be free; and the moral law is even described as a principle
for the deduction of freedom.^
^
However, I think such a statement, although essentially correct, tends
to exaggerate the difference, such that a fundamental similarity
between the two deductions
,
the one in the Groundwork and the one in
the second Critique
, may be overlooked. In both the idea of freedom
functions as a necessary part of the deduction of the moral law:
"freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the moral law.
In the first two chapters of the Foundations, just as in §§1-7 of
the second Critique
, we learn that unlike hypothetical imperatives,
whose intelligibility rests on their analyticity, the categorical impera-
tive is a synthetic a priori practical proposition. Therefore, it is
legitimate for Kant to ask in chapter three: "How is a categorical
imperative possible?", or, to put it another way, "Can pure reason
really be practical?" In order to avoid misunderstanding, Kant is not
asking how a categorical imperative can have effects in the phenome-
nal world, that is, how it manifests itself in action. Kant does, of
course, in the second Critique speak of " moralisches Gefuhl" and
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throughout his moral writings attempts to clarify the causal efficacy of
the will through his Wille -Willkiir distinction as reason dictates; how-
ever
,
he is always quick to point out that any attempt to explain how
freedom is possible, that is, how pure reason shows itself through
effects, would be inconsistent with the Critical spirit: "We are unable
to explain anything unless we can bring it under laws which can have
an object given in some possible experience
.
^
Here, as throughout his Critical philosophy, Kant is seeking to
justify synthetic a priori propositions, in this case the categorical
imperative which asserts that every rational being ought to act accord-
ing to the principle of autonomy.^ As Paton says, "we must take
Kant's main question to be concerned with the relation between a
rational agent as such and the principle of autonomy, and because
this relation is not analytic, Kant is required to show their necessary
connection. It would be difficult to improve upon the following state-
ment by Paton concerning Kant's Critical method:
It seeks to justify a synthetic a priori proposition by tracing
its origin to the nature of mind as such and in particular
to the activity of reason itself. Such a justification is what
Kant calls a 'transcendental deduction'; and it belongs to
a critique or criticism of reason by itself."^
Such a critique is intended to find what Kant in the Foundations
calls a "third term" through which the necessary connection of the sub-
ject and predicate of synthetic a priori propositions will be demon-
strated. And, according to the Foundations , in the case of the moral
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law "the £P.sitive concept of freedom furnishes this third term. This
IS the very place where the deduction of the Foundations seems mis-
guided; there is no positive concept of freedom independent of the moral
law and, therefore, morality cannot be deduced from it. Independent
of the moral law, freedom remains lawless and hence void of objective
validity. Without the moral law there is even no awareness of a posi-
tive concept of freedom: "the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of
freedom
.
^
In recognizing this problem with the deduction of the Foundations
.
I am in agreement with Paton, and, for that matter, I think probably
with Kant himself. However, as much as I respect Paton as a Kantian
scholar, I cannot follow him in seeing the deduction of the Foundations
in such a radical separation from the deduction of the second Critique
.
the Foundations Kant is quick to emphasize that freedom must not be
lawless if it is to have any positive meaning and if it is to be associated
with the concept of will as a kind of causality. Furthermore, Kant is
well aware that this law of freedom is the moral law; in fact, he even
states that "a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the
same. " The alleged vicious circularity of which the deduction of
the second Critique has been accused is, therefore, already present in
1 785
,
although not until the second Critique is Kant really clear in
explaining how to break out of this circularity. Kant is able to justify
the objective reality of both freedom and the moral law in one deduction
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because ultimately their Interdependence is grounded in the necessary
activities of reason itself of which his transcendental deduction offers
a critique.
Let me put my debate with Paton aside for the moment and ask a
question which, as mentioned earlier, I find to be central in understand-
ing Kant's deduction, namely: What does Kant mean by "fact of pure
reason '? In the two quotations in which it is mentioned above,
there seem to be two different meanings: in the first quotation Kant
refers to the moral law itself as the fact and in the second he refers to
the consciousness of this law as the fact. One might, it seems, accept
the latter but not the former; that is, the fact that there is moral con-
sciousness or consciousness of duty surely seems to be a fact, but it
does not appear to be the same or even to justify the objective reality
or the factuality of morality or duty as law itself. Certainly this prima
facie distinction will have to be overcome if Kant's "fact of pure
reason" is to be made clear.
Perhaps some clarity would result if we asked another question,
namely: What kind of fact is Kant referring to in this context? That
is, drawing upon a distinction made by Beck,
"Fact of pure reason" may mean a fact known by pure rea-
son as its object, modo directo
.
Or it may mean the fact
that there is pure reason, known by reason reflexively.
These may be distinguished as "fact for pure reason"
and "fact of pure reason".
To interpret Kant as saying that the moral law is a fact pure reason.
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in the sense that it is either given to or somehow intuited by pure rea-
son, IS obviously the basis for seeing Kant as an ethical intuitionist
.
But this would be inconsistent with the lessons of the first Critique
which argued that there are no facts known by pure reason independently
of sensuous intuition. Furthermore, it would also conflict with what
we already know about the moral law, that it is a creation of reason
itself. Otherwise we could not speak of it as being a fact either of or
for pure practical reason.
Therefore, the latter interpretation of "fact of pure reason"—that
is, the factuality of pure reason itself--is, I think, the correct one,
especially when Kant suggests that the "unconditional law" is "merely
the self-consciousness of a pure practical reason and thus identical
with the positive concept of freedom. The moral law is really an
expression of the lawgivingness of reason itself, of reason's autonomy,
allowing it to be the sole fact of pure reason, known a priori by pure
reason. Furthermore, under this interpretation, we can call the moral
law a fact for pure reason. As Beck puts it: "It is a fact for pure
reason only inasmuch as it is the expression of the fact of pure rea-
son, i.e.
,
of the fact that pure reason can be practical. That is why
the moral law is the sole fact of pure reason and for pure reason.
It is, to be sure, an odd kind of fact, perhaps justifying Kant's calling
it a "fact, as it were. "
But it might be asked, as Kant himself asks, "how is the
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consciousness of that moral law possible ? That is, how is reason's
autonomy a fact? Kant alludes to the answer in the very first para-
graph of his Preface: "If pure reason is actually practical, it will show
Its reality and that of its concepts in action. "25 ^nd, we become
immediately conscious of the moral law, Kant says, "as soon as we
construct maxims for the will. "26 ^ every moral choice reason's
practical nature demonstrates itself in that to deliberate about what
one morally ought to do is to recognize reason's moral constraint, and
hence its practicality, not just as a necessary presupposition but as a
conscious fact. This does not mean that reason must necessarily be
effective, that is, that Willkiir actually follow the commands of Wille
.
but rather that reason's normativity is present even in its rejection.
In a slightly different context Beck recognizes this same point
as true in the case of judgmental errors: "Even though every specific
moral claim that a person acknowledges might be actually invalid
(i.e.
,
he might always think he ought to approve of ^ when, in fact,
he ought to approve of non-a)
, the adjudication of the conflict
between ^ and non-a evidences the fact of reason. "2^ Or, to put this
in another way, whether an imperative is in fact valid or not, if a
person believes that it is valid for him, then the practical nature of
reason is revealed in the very awareness of the imperative force of
the claim upon him.
Our prima facie distinction between the moral law as the fact of
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pure reason and the consciousness of the moral law as the fact of pure
reason can now be dismissed. To be conscious of the moral law is to
be conscious of the prescriptive power of pure practical reason itself
of which the moral law is the sole expression. The moral law is a fact
for any being which is conscious of it, for to be conscious of the moral
law is to confirm pure reason as practical.
How does the fact of pure reason play a role in the deduction,
and what exactly is being deduced? In the following quotation Kant
himself answers part of this question:
Instead of this vainly sought deduction to the moral princi-
ple, however, something entirely different and unexpected
appears: the moral principle itself serves as a principle of
the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience
can prove but which speculative reason had to assume as
at least possible .... This is the faculty of freedom,
which the moral law, itself needing no justifying grounds,
shows to be not only possible but actual in beings which
acknowledge the law as binding upon them.^^
The fact of pure reason, established independently of freedom, forces
man to recognize that he is free. Kant gives an example of a man who
is asked if he thinks it would be possible for him to sacrifice his life
in order not to serve as a means of destroying an honorable man by
lying. Kant goes on to say that the man would surely admit that it
would be possible for him: "He judges, therefore, that he can do some-
thing because he knows that he ought, and he recognizes that he is
free--a fact which, without the moral law, would have remained
unknown to him. " The factuality of moral obligation prescribed by
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reason through its laws presupposes the necessity of freedom, not just
its mere possibility, and provides it with a law which is nothing less
than the autonomy of reason itself. The fact that reason "has causality
in a rational being " demands that the moral law which expresses it
be "a law of causality through freedom.
The moral law thus defines that which speculative philoso-
phy had to leave undefined. That is, it defines the law for
a causality the concept of which was only negative in
speculative philosophy, and for the first time it gives
objective reality to this concept.
But, I would argue that to stop here is to miss the most interest-
ing part of Kant's deduction. As much as Kant decries any deduction
of the moral law, in apparent contradistinction to what he tries to do in
the Foundations
, nevertheless there certainly seems to be one in the
second Critique
. What else would one expect when Kant promises as
early as §6 to show that "freedom and unconditional practical law
3 3
reciprocally imply each other. "
Immediately after proving the objective reality of freedom by way
of the moral law, Kant makes this statement, which I take to be a key
passage in the undeclared deduction of the moral law:
This kind of credential for the moral law, namely, that it is
itself demonstrated to be the principle of the deduction of
freedom as a causality of pure reason, is a sufficient sub-
stitute for any a priori justification, since theoretical
reason had to assume at least the possibility of freedom
in order to fill one of its own needs.
What Kant is saying is rather subtle and draws upon what he has already
established in the first Critique
,
thereby serving to unify the first two
147
Critiques
. Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy showed that the con-
cept of freedom had to be used as a regulative Idea of reason if thought
was to find any unity as it moved through conditions in its search for
the unconditioned. That is, as I tried to show in Part I, theoretical
reason requires us to think of freedom as possible. Kant says in the
Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason that freedom, although at
this point only a problematic concept, is absolutely indispensable to
the complete use of speculative reason.
And because the moral law provides a positive grounding to that
which reason in its theoretical use had to employ in a regulative
fashion, it thereby is transcendentally deduced and hence accredited
independently of its being the fact of pure reason. This Idea of free-
don which was given independent warrant by the theoretical Critique
serves as the "third term" Kant was searching for in the Foundations
when he struggled to deduce the moral law.
It seems to me that Kant came close to this idea in the Foundations ,
because he was certainly aware of and wanted to avoid the apparent
circularity of the deduction he had given:
In this, we must frankly admit, there is shown a kind of cir-
cle, from which, as it seems, there is no way to escape.
In the order of efficient causes we take ourselves to be free
so that we may conceive ourselves to be under moral law
in the order of ends; and we then proceed to think of our-
selves as subject to moral laws on the ground that we have
described our will as free. Freedom and the will's enact-
ment of its own laws are indeed both autonomy--and there-
fore are reciprocal concepts--but precisely for this reason
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one of them cannot be used to explain the other or to furnish
its ground. °
And immediately after saying this, he begins to review what he pre-
viously established in the first Critique
, namely, the need for the two
standpoints of reason—the sensible and the intelligible worlds. As a
member of the latter
,
"man can never conceive the causality of his
own will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of
determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason
must always attribute to itself) is to be free."^^
Having reminded us of this Kant then goes on to say;
The suspicion which we raised above is now removed—namely,
that there might be a hidden circle in our inference from free-
don to autonomy and from autonomy to the moral law; that in
effect we had perhaps assumed the Idea of freedom only be-
cause of the moral law in order subsequently to infer the
moral law in its turn from freedom.
. . .
We see now that
when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves
into the intelligible world as members and recognize the
autonomy of the will together with its consequence—
morality
.
And again: "To the Idea of freedom there is inseparably attached the
concept of autonomy , and to this in turn the universal principle of
morality. It is this "recognition" and "inseparable attachment" that
Kant did not make clear in the Foundations , but he was surely hinting
at the full-blown insights of the second Critique's deduction in assert-
ing that "categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of
1 40
freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world. "
In speaking of the failure of the deduction in the Foundations ,
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Paton says that
we cannot by inference derive morality from the presup-
position of freedom, and still less can we by inference derive
the necessity of presupposing freedom
—
in the positive sense
--from the presupposition that we are members of an intelligi-
ble world. Even in Kant's sense of a 'justification', we can-
not justify morality by anything other than itself.
. . .
This objection by itself is fatal, but in any case we have no
independent insight into the alleged necessity for presup-
posing freedom .^
~~
There are two objections in the above passage, both of which Kant
answers in the second Critique
. Kant agrees that freedom "in the posi-
tive sense" must be derived from the moral law, from the fact of pure
reason; however, he does not agree that "we have no independent
insight into the alleged necessity for presupposing freedom." As Kant
says at the beginning of the deduction:
Beyond objects of experience, i.e., concerning things as
noumena, all positive knowledge was correctly denied to the
speculative reason. This reason, however,was successful
to the extent that it established with certainty the concept
of noumena, i.e.
,
it established the possibility
—
indeed
the necessity—of thinking of them . For example, it showed
against all objections that the assumption of freedom
,
negatively considered
,
was entirely compatible with those
principles and limitations of pure theoretical reason. But
it could not give us anything definite to enlarge our knowl-
edge of such objects, but rather it cut off any such prospect
altogether.
Although it doesn't enlarge our knowledge of noumenal objects, it is the
moral law which provides positive content to that which theoretical
reason was required to employ as a mere Idea. Although I am con-
vinced that Beck has not seen the full potentialities of this insight
into interpreting Kant's deduction, he does nevertheless seem to agree
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with what I have been trying to develop: "The independent warrant of
the concept of freedom—to wit, that it is needed also by theoretical
reason--makes it serve as a systematic credential for the reality of
pure practical reason.
It is in this way that Kant breaks out of the alleged vicious cir-
cle of using freedom to deduce the moral law and the moral law to
deduce freedom. He displays a certain independent warrant for each
concept and then shows each to be the foundation for the other. Free-
dom is deduced from the moral law, which is independently warranted
by being the fact of pure reason, because, through the moral law,
freedom's "transcendent use is changed into an immanent use, whereby
reason becomes, in the field of experience, an efficient cause through
44ideas. " And, on the other hand, in the deduction of the moral law
from freedom, which has independent warrant from the needs of reason
in the first Critique , the reality of the moral law is proven by its
"giving a positive definition to a causality thought merely negatively,
the possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason
though this reason was compelled to assume it."'^^ That is, the
factuality of the moral law is accredited precisely because it serves
to resolve the dialectic of theoretical reason by providing freedom
with a positive foundation. And with this deduction the real unity of
the first two Critiques is revealed—a unity which, as Martin points
out,^^ has been the major source of controversy and misunderstanding
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in Kantian scholarship.
With this transcendental deduction of the second Critique Kant
honors a promise he made in the Preface, namely, to show that "the
practical use of reason is thus connected with the elements of theo-
retical reason. " I tried to show one aspect of this unity of reason in
discussing transcendental and practical freedom and their interdepend-
ence as explained through an examination of Wille -Wilikur
.
But there
I only dealt with a hypothetical necessity—that each without the other
would be incomplete and hence impossible. Now, however, by estab-
lishing independent warrants for both aspects of freedom—warrants
which actually stem from the operations and needs of pure reason
itself—each can be used to justify the objective reality of the other.
These two aspects of freedom really refer to the different purposes of
reason itself in its theoretical and practical functions. The one con-
cerned with knowledge and belief, the other with intention and action.
The Idea of freedom is required by theoretical reason such that to deny
its regulative use would be to deny unity to reason itself—a point I
tried to substantiate in Part I. So too, to deny the moral law, freedom's
positive expression, would be to deny the fact of pure practical reason
which is, to say the same thing, to deny one's essential rationality
as expressed through Wille . Surely then it is true that freedom "is the
keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and
for it is the expression of pure reasoneven of speculative reason.
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itself as it seeks to complete itself in both its theoretical and practical
functions. To fail to explain the essentiality of freedom in both thought
and action is to strip man of his rationality and to remain silent.
(8) An Explanation of the Enigma of the Critical Philosophy
Having established the objective reality of the moral law— "a
law of causality which puts the determining ground of causality above
all conditions of the world of sense —we must now attempt to clear
up the real enigma of the Critical philosophy, namely, how pure reason
had a right to an extension in its practical use which is denied to it in
its speculative use. Having anticipated this problem in the Preface to
the second Critique
, a problem which, as I stated in my introduction,
goes to the very heart of this dissertation, Kant gives a lengthy restate-
ment of it following his transcendental deduction:
We have thought of the will as determinable inasmuch as it
belongs to an intelligible world and of the subject of this
will (man) as belonging to a pure intelligible world, though
in this relation man is unknown to us. (How this relation
can be thought and yet be unknowable has been shown in
the critique of the pure speculative reason.) We have, I
say, thought of man and his will in this way, but further-
more, we have defined the will with respect to its caus-
ality by means of a law which cannot be counted among
the natural laws of the world of sense; finally we have
thereby widened our knowledge beyond the limits of the
world of sense. But this is a presumption which the
Critique of Pure Reason declared to be void in all specu-
lation. How, then, is the practical use of pure reason
to be reconciled with its theoretical use in respect to
determining the boundaries of their competence
In the deduction of the concept of causality and other concepts of
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the understanding
,
Kant was able to escape the scepticism of Hume only
by way of his transcendental idealism, that is, only by realizing that
such concepts apply to the appearances of our experience and not to
things-in-themselves as Hume thought. In that way he showed that
causality was necessary to connect such appearances into a meaning-
ful experience which required certain definite temporal relationships.
But now it seems Kant is doing the very thing which his critique of pure
reason forbids, namely, to extend the use of these concepts to noumena.
As Kant puts it:
But how lies it with reference to the application of this cate-
gory of causality ... to things which are not objects of
possible experience but lie beyond its boundaries? For it
must be remembered that I could deduce the objective reality
of these concepts only with reference to objects of possible
experience
But interestingly enough it is the deduction Kant refers to in an
effort to clear up the difficulty. In proving the objective reality of the
concept of cause with reference to objects of experience, Kant reminds
us that he thereby deduced it as an a priori concept. That is, he
"could show its possibility from pure understanding without any empiri-
cal sources. " This fact allows the concept of causality to be
"referred to objects in general, whether sensuous or not. " To see
only the restrictions that the Critique of Pure Reason places upon
thought and to overlook the real power and freedom that it gives to
thought" after banishing empiricism from its origin"^*^ is to completely
miss the transcendental thrust that the Critical Copernical Revolution
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gives to the nature of mind.
This thrust can be stated quite simply: Reason, by its very nature,
has the right, the necessity, and the freedom to think beyond what it
can know. But such a simple statement is heavy-laden with fruitful
consequences for metaphysical thought of which the practical use of
reason is a proper and necessary exemplification. In the Preface to the
second edition to the first Critique
. Kant says:
But though I cannot know, I can yet think freedom; that is to
say, the representation of it is at least not self-contradictory,
provided due account be taken of our critical distinction
between the two modes of representation, the sensible and
the intellectual, and of the resulting limitation of the pure
concepts of understanding and of the principles which flow
from them.^^
Through his transcendental idealism Kant has opened up the doors for
reason to fulfill its own nature and function to actualize its own pur-
poses. By limiting knowledge Kant makes room for faith^^ which is
really reason's ability to transcend its own empirical employment and
carve out, with the a priori concepts which have been granted it,
certain metaphysical frameworks through which it can unify its opera-
tions and provide unconditioned grounding for finite man who must
seek knowledge through conditions. This is what Kant is referring to
when he speaks of the rightful extension of the concepts of the under-
standing into the realm of the intelligible.
The only thing that is lacking in extending such concepts is the
condition for applying these categories, such as causality, to objects.
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This condition, of course, is intuition. But the lack of such a condi-
tion only rendered the purposes of theoretical knowledge impossible.
"Still, the objective reality of the concept remains and can even be
used with reference to noumena, though it is not in the least theoreti-
cally defined, and no knowledge can be effected with it.
/f*Reason_7 can altogether abstract the concept of cause it-
self from that application to objects which has theoretical
knowledge as its purpose, since this concept can always be
found a priori in the understanding, independently of any
intuition. Thus reason uses this concept only for a practi-
cal purpose, transferring the determining ground of the will
to the intelligible order of things, at the same time readily
confessing that it does not understand how the concept of
cause can be a condition of the knowledge of these things.
Furthermore, through the transcendental deduction of the principle
of pure practical reason we have other conditions for applying the con-
cept of causality to noumena. Not only was there a need to find a
positive law for the expression of a causality through freedom whose
Idea theoretical reason had to assume, but also the "objective reality
of a pure will or of a pure practical reason (they being the same) is
given in the moral law a priori, as it were by a fact. And in the
concept "of a pure will there is the concept of causality with free-
dom. This we learned from our analysis of Wille -Willkur . There-
fore, after identifying the nonempirical origin of the concept of
causality and having justified the moral law's objective reality Kant
is enabled to say:
Even though I have no intuition which would determine its
objective theoretical reality, it f~::ausality through free-
dom_7 nevertheless has a real application exhibited
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concrsto in intGntions or maximsj that is, its practical
reality can be pointed out. All this is sufficient to justify
the concept even with reference to noumena.^^
What was therefore thought to be an enigma turns out to be a
failure to understand the proper functions of reason as it takes on dif-
ferent attitudes and sets up different frameworks. It is the same under-
standing of reason that allowed Kant to solve the Third Antinomy which
now allows him to explain the extension of concepts into the noumenal
realm via a practical use. As transcendental, reason is not chained
to any one of its specific interests but can move freely in and out of
each of its postulated metaphysical contexts governed by its own set
of principles. And in explaining the concept of freedom in both its
theoretical and practical contexts, Kant has not only demonstrated the
mutual support that each context gives the other and thereby the unity
of reason's own operations, but also the freedom of reason itself as
it goes about spontaneously legislating laws for each framework. The
force of this latter point is striking when we come to realize that
freedom in both its theoretical and practical use must ultimately be
traced back to the nature of reason in its quest for order, unity and
intelligibility.
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have tackled the problem of interpreting the
Kantian metaphysics. By concentrating on the problem of freedom, I
have made some discoveries that serve to unify what has previously
been seen by many Kantian scholars as a bifurcation within the Critical
system. I was led to choose the concept of freedom as the focus of
this dissertation by Kant himself who proclaims it as the "keystone" of
the whole structure of his metaphysics, and, why not, since it is
essentially the freedom of reason that provides the answer to the ques-
tion "How is metaphysics possible?" Without the spontaneity of pure
reason there is no way reason can make sense of or even begin its
own reflexive critique with all of the demands and dimensions that such
a critique must satisfy. Hence, a vindication of freedom is paramount
to the very foundation of the Kantian metaphysics as well as, I think,
the primary avenue to its explanation.
I have agreed with most Kantian scholars that when dealing with
the Critique of Pure Reason we are at the center of the critical system,
although, oddly enough, scholars as diverse as Heidegger, Baton and
Bennett seem to find the beginning and end of that center in the Analy-
tic, breaking off their commentaries before the Transcendental Dialectic.
This is not to mention the whole stream of positivistic thinkers who
concentrate on Kant's negative soundings on speculative metaphysics.
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apparently forgetting the same Kant who speaks of transcendental Ideas
and a whole realm of meaningful transcendental reflection. What I
have maintained in this dissertation is that the Critique of Pure Reason
is the center of Kant's thinking only if one realizes that the Dialectic
is not only important to understanding the true meaning of Kant, but,
more strongly, quite fundamental to providing unity and intelligibility
to the work of the understanding in the Analytic.
Even scholars such as Smith, Cassirer and Strawson who have
given attention to the Dialectic have done so, it seems to me, with
much misunderstanding, perhaps primarily due to their underestimating
the importance of Kant's regulative employment of pure reason. As I
have argued in Part I of this dissertation, this employment of reason
is the key to grasping the unity of the work of reason in the Analytic
and in the Dialectic. It is also the key to grasping an even more
essential insight, which to my mind has been radically overlooked,
namely, the dependence of the empirical employment of reason upon its
transcendental reflective activity which is uncovered by Kant in the
Dialectic.
Although I agree that the first Critique is the center of Kant's
thinking, because it is here that Kant demonstrates the distinctions
as well as the interrelations between the transcendental ideality of
appearances and the realm of noumena wherein the concept of freedom
is found, nevertheless the real climax of the Critical philosophy does
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not occur until the Critique of Practical Reason
. Here Kant demonstrates
the objective reality of noumenal freedom which, up to this time,
reason could only think of and use as an Idea of pure speculation. As
I have argued in the dissertation, this in no way implies that the
transcendental Idea of freedom, whose possibility was proven in the
solution of the Third Antinomy, is not needed as a necessary presup-
position of pure reason in order to unify the empirical operations of the
understanding. In fact, it is this very requirement of pure reason
brought out by Kant in the Dialectic of the first Critique which I think
Kantian scholarship has sadly neglected. Furthermore, as I have also
argued in Part II of this dissertation, this requirement serves as the
clue to unraveling the apparent circularity of the transcendental deduc-
tion of freedom in the second Critique and, to go a giant step further,
it allows us to begin to see the unity between the two Critiques them-
selves. However, the inquiries of the Critique of Pure Reason only
provide the prelude for reason's constructing a foundation for the
objective reality of freedom without which the full-blown ontological
significance of noumenal reality and, consequently, the justification
of the complete activities of pure reason remain incomplete.
In other words, having completed its preparatory task, the first
Critique now awaits the work of practical reason in the second Critique
to fully explore and actualize the exciting possible avenues that it
has discovered, one of which is the idea of a causality through freedom.
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But this, of cours6
,
is an undorstatomont bocauso it has givan to tha
sacond Critiqua
,
and for that mattar to tha third Critiqua as wall, mora
than just a task and a challanga; it has givan pura raason an awara-
nass of its own incomplatanass and providad it with a diraction and a
sat of concapts and idaas through which it can bagin to fulfill tha
damands and tansions found within its own natura. That is, tha prin-
ciples found within the Dialectic free reason to meaningfully explore
dimensions beyond the empirical, namely the moral, the religious, and
the aesthetic—dimensions within which reason finds its real dignity.
Such a view of the relations between the Critiques , a relation which I
hope my work in this dissertation has revealed and defended, is
radically different from seeing the Critiques in utter contradistinction
with each other as many Kantian scholars have proclaimed. In short,
I have attempted to bring to life Kant's belief that the first two Critiques
compose a unity, a belief which perhaps finds its clearest expression
in the following quotation:
The speculative restriction of pure reason and its practi-
cal extension bring it into that relation of equality in
which reason in general can be employed suitable to
its end, and this example proves better than any other that
the path to wisdom , if it is to be made sure and not to be
impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably
pass through science; but it is not till this is completed
that we can be convinced that it leads to this goal.
But as I have stated in my introduction and elsewhere, it is this
"extension" of reason into the practical where the enigma of the Kantian
program is found and which has to be resolved before the Kantian
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metaphysics can possibly be seen as sound. The last chapter of this
dissertation, and for that matter the entire work of Part 11 on freedom
and action, attempts to provide just such a resolution, a resolution
which, to be sure, has been hinted at but never fully explored. Although
my explanation of the enigma of the Critical philosophy, which culmin-
ates in my final section, may seem to be inappropriately brief for what
I and others have claimed to be such an essential problem, it actually
turns out to be a truth which, as I have tried to show, immediately and
clearly falls out of the arguments and results of Kant's demonstration
of the objective reality of freedom and the insights into the activities
of pure reason that such a demonstration reveals. This is not to say
that the enigma is not a central focal point or springboard into under-
standing the Kantian program, for that this is so is recognized by Kant
himself. However, it is only after practical freedom is fully validated
that this riddle can be resolved. In fact, the transcendental deduction
of freedom serves as its final resolution. To say the same thing, I
have tried to defend what Kant saw as the exciting and climactic dis-
covery of the second Critique , which is "the grand revelation which we
obtain through practical reason by means of the moral law, the revela-
tion, namely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the other-
112
wise transcendent concept of freedom."
A fundamental insight that runs throughout my inquiries into Kant's
theory of freedom is its reciprocity with the activities of reason and
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the ontological ramifications that such a reciprocity carries with it.
By vindicating the Idea of freedom in the first Critique and by showing
its reality in the activities of the moral subject in the second Critique
.
Kant has, I think, justified and revealed the spontaneity of pure reason
as the source of being. We might then say that freedom is the funda-
mental concept of being for the Critical philosophy.
One cannot read Kant without being struck by the fact that for him
there are different modes of being. The meaningfulness of the concept
of reality goes beyond the reality of appearances. But, more important
to my point, as early as the transcendental deduction of the categories
of the first Critique
,
the spontaneous legislative character of reason
was introduced as well as the implications this had for the being of
a transcendental thinking subject. That is, the ontological implica-
tions for noumenal reality are present long before even the Dialectic of
the Critique of Pure Reason . Not only that, but their connections with
a pure spontaneity of reason have already emerged.
However, unless Kant can make sense out of the concept of free-
dom and demonstrate its reality, any meaningfulness to a mode of
reality beyond appearances, or, for that matter, the being of appear-
ances itself is groundless. Of course, there is a certain circularity
to this program since reason is attempting to trace and give a critical
account of the nature of its own activities and principles, and it would
be absurd to think it could do so without using these very same activities
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and principles. What else could be expected of a critique of reason by
itself? In fact, the Critical philosophy is a transcendental deduction
of the principles of reason by reason itself. Reason realizes that it
must be free to transcend the empirical limitations of the understanding
to carve out ontological models and set up principles for meaningful
investigation of such models or else face contradictions and incom-
pleteness within its own nature.
To say that reason is free to originate contexts of meaning in no
way implies an unrestricted freedom, if that notion even has any mean-
ing. Within each of the contexts or frameworks that reason carves
out there must be necessary laws which reason must locate and to
which it must conform if it is to obey its own rationality. These neces-
sary laws, however, can only be understood from within that context,
whether it be theoretical, moral or teleological.
As we realized in the case of the practical, there really is no
ground for free legislation independent of the moral law, which is, to
be sure, a necessity which reason finds nowhere but within its own
nature. This need to legislate other contexts or models for interpreting
events was also evident in the solution to the Third Antinomy where
reason realizes the necessity for transcendental or speculative reflec-
tion in order to provide unity to the theoretical activities of the
understanding as it works to make phenomenal nature intelligible
through the categories. And, furthermore, as I indicated at the end
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of Part I of this dissertation, there is no need to see the third Critique
as a change in Kant's view of nature, but rather as a consistent appli-
cation of reason's freedom in setting up yet another context for mean-
ingfully interpreting events. This, of course, is to be done again with
the guide of necessary principles—in this case the principle of pur-
posiveness formed from another demand of reason as it is both teleo-
logically and aesthetically interpreted. It is with the ideas that I have
discovered in this dissertation that I should like to investigate the
third Critique in the future, again using the concept of freedom as a
focal point as I think Kant himself suggests,^ being thereby consistent
with his statement in the Preface to the second Critique of seeing free-
don as "The keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure
reason.
"
Of course, these various frameworks are not determined by reason
alone. The Kantian metaphysics is not pure idealism. The multi-
dimensional character of reason is sensitive to and attempts to accomo-
date the multidimensional character of human experience. The various
attitudes reason takes toward experience, whether it be theoretical,
moral or aesthetic, are demands which human experiences will not
allow it to overlook. Such experiences reason seeks to make meaning-
ful according to principles which can only be discovered and justified
by a critique of its own activities.
But of fundamental importance to this dissertation is the fact
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that the various dimensions of human experience cannot be made meaning-
ful independent of reason's spontaneity in legislating frameworks of
explanation according to principles which carve out different modes of
being. This spontaneity was a necessary presupposition in the first
Critique with the pure theoretical self-consciousness of the "I-think,"
even though its objective reality as a mode of being was not demon-
strated until the second Critique with the pure practical self-consciousness
of the "I-will". This is not the discovery of two different rational selves,
but rather one and the same reason discovering and exercising its free-
don within different dimensions
. And by so doing
,
it affirms its own
intelligible being—a being which, unlike the being of appearances,
cannot be known but which must necessarily be presupposed in thought
and which necessarily reveals itself in action
.
This is reason tran-
scending what it can empirically know in order not only to make sense
out of such knowledge but also to make sense out of those other dimen-
sions of its being which reveal themselves through the very act of this
transcendence
.
This act of transcendence by reason of its own conditionedness
is the true expression of finitude, for it is reason's search for the
unconditioned which will provide it unity. And although this is the
ideal of pure reason, it is not empty, for, in the realm of the practical,
reason discovers the unconditioned moral law which gives an ontologi-
cal grounding to what the first Critique presupposed from its very
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beginnings, namely, that reason is fundamentally free and legislative.
Surely then there can be no doubt that freedom is central for Kant's
Critical thinking, for it carries with it reason's limitations as well as
reason's prescriptions for the realization of human dignity.
Although I have tried in this dissertation to demonstrate the
centrality of freedom for the Kantian metaphysics, I realize that I have
only hinted at and not fully developed a solution to a Kantian ontology.
The Kantian problems concerning a theory of being run as historically
deep as the ancient debate between Plato and Aristotle. Realizing that
there are fundamental ontological distinctions the question for Kant, as
it was for Plato and Aristotle, concerns how to relate them. And just
as Kant sees truth in both empiricism and rationalism in building the
Critical epistemology, the same holds true in coming to terms with a
Kantian theory of being
.
Undoubtedly there is a Platonic character in Kant's making the dis-
tinction between the realms of phenomena and noumena and yet he does
not want to tear the unity of reality apart into two separate worlds . This
is quite obvious in his solution to the Third Antinomy and in the intro-
duction to the Third Critique , a work which he claims to be the final
unification of all dimensions of being. Kant links with Aristotlian
leanings, however, when he speaks of events and man as having
dimensions of being qua sensible and qua intelligible . That is, being
for Kant is unintelligible if seen as uni vocal. Yet Kant's theory of
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mind is absolutely anti-Aristotlian. Concepts are not gained totally
through abstraction but rather are found in the purity of the mind itself.
And even though they are applicable to nature only when they have been
schematized, the purity of their origin, as 1 tried to bring out in the
final section of this dissertation, justified for Kant their extension
beyond the realm of nature. This grounding for transcendental reflec-
tive thought is a possibility that Aristotle does not have; and it is a
grounding Kant makes full use of in suggesting reason's free legislative
power to make meaningful a variety of different modes or dimensions
of being
.
Thus I am suggesting as a possibility for further study that the
concept of freedom is the real key to unlocking Kant's theory of being.
I believe that this dissertation is the beginning toward such a study in
that it has demonstrated the importance of freedom for Kant's Critical
thought as a whole and has shown how Kant has vindicated its tran-
scendental use in the Dialectic and transcendentally deduced its
objective reality in the second Critique
. But more importantly, I
believe that by doing these things I have revealed the meaningful
reciprocity between freedom and the activities of pure reason as it
engages in its own critique. Without an insight into this reciprocity,
a Kantian theory of being will remain an enigma, and any Kantian
explanation of the theoretical, moral and teleological dimensions of
man's being will be found unintelligible.
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I think that the importance of freedom to the unity of Kant's
thought as a whole is clearly stated by Kant himself in the introduction
to the third Critique and shall, therefore, serve as a fitting conclud-
ing statement as to the importance of the work of this dissertation in
its own right and as a basis for future study of the Critical philosophy:
Albeit, then, between the realm of the natural concept, as
the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as
the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is
not possible to pass from the former to the latter (by means
of the theoretical employment of reason), just as if they
were so many separate worlds
,
the first of which is power-
less to exercise influence on the second: still the latter is
meant to influence the former—that is to say, the concept
of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world the
end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also
be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the con-
formity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the
possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to
the law of freedom.—There must, therefore, be a ground of
the unity of the surpersensible /~sic .7* that lies at the
basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains
in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground
neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge
of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it
renders possible the transition from the mode of thought
according to the principles of the one to that according to
the principles of the other.
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too finds this to be the reason why Kantignores the true Critical solution to the Third Antinomy (p. 213).
A533=B561 - A534=B562
. There he defines freedom in thepractical sense as "The will’s independence of coercion through
sensuous impulses" and points out that it, unlike transcendental free-dom, presupposes the notion of ought
.
20
,
A804=B832
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ant s belief that without transcendental freedom there would be no
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of transcendental freedom has been shown, the requirements of
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about this in Part II
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It in one paragraph and does recognize it as being fundamental to Kant's
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says "I do not propose to worry myself over the intricacies of the
reasoning Kant brings forward here. Instead, I shall in what follows
raise a much more general issue, namely, why he offers so curious
end unsatisfactory a solution of the antinomy between natural and
non-natural causation. The main reason would seem to be that he is
unduly preoccupied with the problem of moral freedom" (pp. 305-306).
I am suggesting that Cassirer should have undertaken the worry.
But such a statement is quite in keeping with Cassirer's
sceptisism over Kant's understanding of the unconditioned as the
supreme principle of reason (pp. 240-243). Perhaps this is why he
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sions with my colleague, Daniel Gordon, at the University of Massa-
chusetts at Amherst.
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